DC political prognosticator Charlie Cook is getting a lot of attention for his doom and gloom about Democrats’ chances this November. He has controversially asserted that health care reform is Barack Obama’s Iraq War and that the Democrats will likely lose the House.
It’s worth pointing out that other major political pundits don’t (yet) agree with Cook’s forecast; Larry Sabato and Stuart Rothenberg, for example, still see Republican gains in the House in the mid-to-upper 20s. Cook’s analysis can’t be totally dismissed, however. Congressional approval ratings, though always low, are scraping the bottom of the barrel. Democratic enthusiasm is hugely down, economic forecasts indicate slow job growth through the end of the year, and Obama’s approval rating is the second-lowest of any president at this point.
Moreover, young and minority voters are unlikely to turn out in large numbers; many, even if supportive of Obama and liberal-ish in their views, aren’t especially political and may treat the midterms with apathy. As Obama’s approval ratings are low with older voters and white voters, a turnout favoring them could well deliver the GOP big gains.
Nonetheless, Cook’s analysis seems flawed to me. It’s not that Democrats couldn’t lose the House. And it’s not just the standard “a week is a lifetime in politics,” caveat. Rather, Cook seems to me to miss many mitigating factors, and I’m curious if others agree.
First, I don’t think Cook accounts for the weakness of the GOP brand, which remains very low. It’s true that in an anti-incumbent year, Democrats will be the main losers as the party in power. But while large GOP gains aren’t out of the question, the voters’ low enthusiasm for the GOP seems to me to be a major hurdle. Hatred of the GOP could prove extremely potent in getting a higher proportion of Democratic-leaning voters to the polls. In 1994, pre-Newt’s speakership, surveys showed Democrats had relatively low disapproval of the Republican Party.
Second, I think Cook understates the potential for Democratic mobilization. Especially if Democrats can pass health care reform, they will likely at least stabilize their position with Democratic-leaners and have a concrete – and real – achievement to champion before the voters. Frankly, even without that, mobilization alone would shift turnout somewhat in their favor. And by all accounts, it appears that Obama will take a major personal stake in the midterms. This will be an all-out, nationalized campaign, and while there will be districts where that will be hindrance, revving up Democratic voters and convincing them to turn out and vote could well save several marginal seats.
Third, I think Cook underestimates Obama’s continuing popularity. There’s no doubt that Obama’s numbers have fallen, but the public still likes Obama personally by a heavy margin. And for all the talk of Democratic disillusionment, approval and enthusiasm for the president among Democratic-leaners remains extremely high. Comparisons with Bill Clinton are difficult, as Clinton’s approval ratings in early 1994 were actually quite high. But by the late spring of ’94, Clinton’s job and personal ratings were significantly down due to several big political defeats and the controversies over Whitewater. While Obama’s job approval ratings and personal favorability ratings could fall to the low 40s, I have a hard time seeing them doing so. And if Obama’s ratings are around 50% in November 2010 and if he maintains high personal approval ratings, it would add up to a less hostile climate for Democrats than they faced in 1994.
All of these factors suggest to me that Republican gains will likely top out at the mid-to-upper 20s or low 30s, in the House. And the potential is there, actually, for actual losses to prove smaller. Unless there is a double-digit recession, it is difficult (though, again, not impossible) for me to see Republicans picking up 40+ seats. If, as forecasted, we have at least some modest job growth, approval ratings for Obama around 50%, passage of health care reform and at least a few other popular items, and Democratic mobilization heavier-than-today, that points towards more modest losses than what Cook is forecasting.
In fairness to Cook, we’re in somewhat uncharted waters here. Neither 1994 or 2006 looked like wave elections this far out, although moderate gains for the opposition in both years seemed likely. In both years, voter anger grew and grew and didn’t peak prior to election day.
This year, the level of angst is present so early that it’s hard to predict what will over the coming months. It is entirely plausible that the seeming wave will crest. Democrats are aware of voter anger far earlier and for the GOP to look like they’re returning to power this early on may give time for wavering voters to have second thoughts. Alternately, the wave could build, which would indicate catastrophic losses for Democrats. Or it could remain roughly the same as it is today.
So do people agree? Disagree? Or is Cook right regardless of the factors I name?