Texas has always been, in my mind, the most interesting state for redistricting in 2010, partly because it grew much more than any other state (it gained four seats, while no other state gained more than two), and partly because much of that growth was Hispanic. This sets up a major conflict in the redistricting process: the Republicans, who control the trifecta here, will want to draw as many of those four new seats for themselves as possible, obviously, but the Obama administration’s Dept. of Justice, via the Voting Rights Act, will compel the creation of as many majority-minority seats as possible. Given the numbers that came out today, Texas Republicans may actually feel lucky getting away with two of the four new seats… assuming that’s what they end up with, after the conclusion of the inevitable litigation process that will result.
Texas gained a whopping 4,293,741 people between 2000 and 2010, growing from 20,851,820 to 25,145,561. Of that 4+ million, only about 10% were non-Hispanic whites. The non-Hispanic white population in 2000 was 10,933,313, and in 2010 it’s 11,397,345, a difference of 464,032. Contrast that with the growth in Hispanics, who went from 6,669,616 to 9,460,921, a gain of 2,791,305. Expressed as percentages, Texas now has only a plurality, not a majority, of non-Hispanic whites. They make up 45.3% of the population in 2010, along with 11.5% non-Hispanic blacks, 3.8% non-Hispanic Asians, and 37.6% Hispanics. (In 2000, non-Hispanic whites were 52.4%, along with 11.3% black, 2.7% Asian, and 32% Hispanic. Those don’t add up to 100 because there are also categories for Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, two or more races, and “some other” race.)
With Texas about to expand to 36 seats, that means the target average for each new congressional district will be 698,488. Here’s a chart that looks at each current congressional district, giving old and new populations, the amount gained (or lost), and the “deviation,” which is what we’re calling how many people each district will need to shed (or in a few cases, gain) in order to hit its 2010 target. (In case you’re wondering, yes, the 2000 data is for the post-2004 DeLay-mander configurations of each district.) I’m also including the 2000 and 2008 presidential election results, so you can see which direction the districts are headed (very different, when you contrast the trend in rural east Texas districts with suburbs for the major cities).
District | Rep. | 2000 total | 2010 total | Total change | Deviation | 2000 election | 2008 election |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TX-01 | Gohmert (R) | 651,652 | 723,464 | 71,812 | 24,976 | 33/68 | 31/69 |
TX-02 | Poe (R) | 651,605 | 782,375 | 130,770 | 83,887 | 37/63 | 40/60 |
TX-03 | Johnson, S. (R) | 651,782 | 842,449 | 190,667 | 143,961 | 30/70 | 42/57 |
TX-04 | Hall (R) | 651,500 | 846,142 | 194,642 | 147,654 | 34/66 | 30/69 |
TX-05 | Hensarling (R) | 651,919 | 725,642 | 73,723 | 27,154 | 34/66 | 36/63 |
TX-06 | Barton (R) | 651,691 | 809,095 | 157,404 | 110,607 | 34/66 | 40/60 |
TX-07 | Culberson (R) | 651,682 | 780,611 | 128,929 | 82,123 | 31/69 | 41/58 |
TX-08 | Brady (R) | 651,755 | 833,770 | 182,015 | 135,282 | 31/69 | 26/74 |
TX-09 | Green, A. (D) | 651,086 | 733,796 | 82,710 | 35,308 | 69/31 | 77/23 |
TX-10 | McCaul (R) | 651,523 | 981,367 | 329,844 | 282,879 | 34/67 | 44/55 |
TX-11 | Conaway (R) | 651,590 | 710,682 | 59,092 | 12,194 | 25/75 | 24/76 |
TX-12 | Granger (R) | 651,770 | 831,100 | 179,330 | 132,612 | 36/64 | 36/63 |
TX-13 | Thornberry (R) | 651,665 | 672,781 | 21,116 | (25,707) | 26/74 | 23/77 |
TX-14 | Paul (R) | 651,837 | 779,704 | 127,867 | 81,216 | 36/64 | 33/66 |
TX-15 | Hinojosa (D) | 651,580 | 787,124 | 135,544 | 88,636 | 54/46 | 60/40 |
TX-16 | Reyes (D) | 652,363 | 757,427 | 105,064 | 58,939 | 59/41 | 66/34 |
TX-17 | Flores (R) | 651,509 | 760,042 | 108,533 | 61,554 | 32/68 | 32/67 |
TX-18 | Jackson-Lee (D) | 651,789 | 720,991 | 69,202 | 22,503 | 72/28 | 77/22 |
TX-19 | Neugebauer (R) | 651,610 | 698,137 | 46,527 | (351) | 25/75 | 27/72 |
TX-20 | Gonzalez (D) | 651,603 | 711,705 | 60,102 | 13,217 | 58/42 | 63/36 |
TX-21 | Smith (R) | 651,930 | 856,954 | 205,024 | 158,466 | 31/69 | 41/58 |
TX-22 | Olson (R) | 651,657 | 910,877 | 259,220 | 212,389 | 33/67 | 41/58 |
TX-23 | Canseco (R) | 651,149 | 847,651 | 196,502 | 149,163 | 47/54 | 51/48 |
TX-24 | Marchant (R) | 651,137 | 792,319 | 141,182 | 93,831 | 32/68 | 44/55 |
TX-25 | Doggett (D) | 651,477 | 814,381 | 162,904 | 115,893 | 47/53 | 59/40 |
TX-26 | Burgess (R) | 651,858 | 915,137 | 263,279 | 216,649 | 38/62 | 41/58 |
TX-27 | Farenthold (R) | 651,843 | 741,993 | 90,150 | 43,505 | 50/50 | 53/46 |
TX-28 | Cuellar (D) | 651,259 | 851,824 | 200,565 | 153,336 | 50/50 | 56/44 |
TX-29 | Green, G. (D) | 651,405 | 677,032 | 25,627 | (21,456) | 57/43 | 62/38 |
TX-30 | Johnson, E. (D) | 652,261 | 706,469 | 54,208 | 7,981 | 74/26 | 82/18 |
TX-31 | Carter (R) | 651,868 | 902,101 | 250,233 | 203,613 | 32/69 | 42/58 |
TX-32 | Sessions (R) | 650,555 | 640,419 | (10,136) | (58,069) | 36/64 | 46/53 |
Now let’s turn to the changes in racial composition in each district. The Hispanic population increased in all of Texas’s 32 districts, with the smallest increase being 35,816 (in TX-32 in north Dallas, the only district which lost population overall – I’m not quite sure why this district lost population, other than the fact that it’s fairly dense, and boxed in by other urban districts, so it’s unable to sprawl in any direction). Eight districts gained more than 100,000 Hispanics each, with the biggest gain in the Laredo-based TX-28, gaining 166,375. The second biggest gain was 159,747 in TX-10, the wormlike district that links Houston’s western suburbs with Austin’s eastern suburbs and which gained a whole lot of everybody of all races. TX-10 is also more remarkable in that the Hispanic share of the total population nearly went up 10%, from 19% to 29% (by contrast, in TX-28, the Hispanic share barely increased, seeing as how they’re already the vast majority there).
These two existing districts point to where two of the new VRA districts are likeliest to pop up: the Rio Grande Valley, and the Houston area. (A new Hispanic-majority Houston seat would probably be located in the downtown and western parts of town, pushing TX-07 and then TX-10 further west.) The third possibility is a Dallas area Hispanic-majority seat, which might be anchored in downtown and western Dallas but wander further west to grab areas near DFW airport and maybe even in Fort Worth. The GOP, I’m sure, would prefer to try to limit the number of VRA seats to two, but it may be a difficult balancing act; in particular, it’ll be hard to avoid having a new VRA seat pop up in the Rio Grande Valley (thanks to huge growth in TX-15 and TX-23, too) if they’re going to try to reconstruct a more Republican-favorable TX-27 in order to protect unexpected new member Blake Farenthold (maybe linking Corpus Christi with Victoria instead of Brownsville, for instance).
District | 2000 white | White % | 2010 white | White % | % change | 2000 Hispanic | Hispanic % | 2010 Hispanic | Hispanic % | % change |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TX-01 | 485,238 | 74.5 | 514,939 | 71.2 | -3.2 | 59,688 | 9.2 | 109,499 | 15.1 | 6.0 |
TX-02 | 462,830 | 71.0 | 493,830 | 63.1 | -7.9 | 82,578 | 12.7 | 176,196 | 22.5 | 9.8 |
TX-03 | 467,828 | 71.8 | 539,627 | 64.1 | -7.7 | 111,121 | 17.0 | 186,890 | 22.2 | 5.1 |
TX-04 | 540,477 | 83.0 | 666,802 | 78.8 | -4.2 | 50,410 | 7.7 | 110,993 | 13.1 | 5.4 |
TX-05 | 505,283 | 77.5 | 523,328 | 72.1 | -5.4 | 83,113 | 12.7 | 157,037 | 21.6 | 8.9 |
TX-06 | 477,168 | 73.2 | 537,602 | 66.4 | -6.8 | 103,380 | 15.9 | 185,397 | 22.9 | 7.0 |
TX-07 | 505,703 | 77.6 | 529,586 | 67.8 | -9.8 | 117,392 | 18.0 | 198,587 | 25.4 | 7.4 |
TX-08 | 553,472 | 84.9 | 686,659 | 82.4 | -2.6 | 58,820 | 9.0 | 128,027 | 15.4 | 6.3 |
TX-09 | 213,041 | 32.7 | 240,882 | 32.8 | 1.1 | 213,195 | 32.7 | 310,931 | 42.4 | 9.6 |
TX-10 | 490,353 | 75.3 | 676,833 | 69.0 | -6.3 | 122,894 | 18.9 | 282,641 | 28.8 | 9.9 |
TX-11 | 523,788 | 80.4 | 577,078 | 81.2 | 0.8 | 192,811 | 29.6 | 257,633 | 36.3 | 6.7 |
TX-12 | 505,402 | 77.5 | 635,292 | 76.4 | -1.1 | 154,032 | 23.6 | 239,268 | 28.8 | 5.2 |
TX-13 | 526,737 | 80.8 | 544,719 | 81.0 | 0.2 | 114,488 | 17.6 | 157,732 | 23.4 | 5.9 |
TX-14 | 491,492 | 75.4 | 588,513 | 75.5 | 0.1 | 162,778 | 25.0 | 226,440 | 29.0 | 4.1 |
TX-15 | 504,686 | 77.5 | 674,927 | 85.7 | 8.3 | 506,447 | 77.7 | 649,297 | 82.5 | 4.8 |
TX-16 | 483,295 | 74.1 | 620,074 | 81.9 | 7.8 | 507,249 | 77.8 | 617,465 | 81.5 | 3.8 |
TX-17 | 512,489 | 78.7 | 585,982 | 77.1 | -1.6 | 100,241 | 15.4 | 157,049 | 20.7 | 5.3 |
TX-18 | 240,569 | 36.9 | 281,511 | 39.0 | 2.1 | 231,548 | 35.5 | 313,533 | 43.5 | 8.0 |
TX-19 | 502,156 | 77.1 | 549,589 | 78.7 | 1.7 | 188,932 | 29.0 | 235,973 | 33.8 | 4.8 |
TX-20 | 425,519 | 65.3 | 500,530 | 70.3 | 5.0 | 437,800 | 67.2 | 509,208 | 71.5 | 4.4 |
TX-21 | 531,029 | 81.5 | 680,337 | 79.4 | -2.1 | 138,599 | 21.3 | 240,713 | 28.1 | 6.8 |
TX-22 | 464,216 | 71.2 | 557,629 | 61.2 | -10.0 | 132,379 | 20.3 | 244,900 | 26.9 | 6.6 |
TX-23 | 467,321 | 71.8 | 672,404 | 79.3 | 7.6 | 423,648 | 65.1 | 562,913 | 66.4 | 1.3 |
TX-24 | 476,428 | 73.2 | 488,398 | 61.6 | -11.5 | 116,586 | 17.9 | 214,851 | 27.1 | 9.2 |
TX-25 | 439,574 | 67.5 | 584,962 | 71.8 | 4.3 | 220,942 | 33.9 | 315,776 | 38.8 | 4.9 |
TX-26 | 474,910 | 72.9 | 652,345 | 71.3 | -1.6 | 93,451 | 14.3 | 193,973 | 21.2 | 6.9 |
TX-27 | 495,162 | 76.0 | 623,615 | 84.0 | 8.1 | 443,919 | 68.1 | 543,306 | 73.2 | 5.1 |
TX-28 | 518,245 | 79.6 | 748,669 | 87.9 | 8.3 | 505,754 | 77.7 | 672,129 | 78.9 | 1.2 |
TX-29 | 357,764 | 54.9 | 398,350 | 58.8 | 3.9 | 430,980 | 66.2 | 514,861 | 76.0 | 9.9 |
TX-30 | 238,931 | 36.6 | 256,028 | 36.2 | -0.4 | 223,200 | 34.2 | 280,508 | 39.7 | 5.5 |
TX-31 | 477,328 | 73.2 | 647,694 | 71.8 | -1.4 | 106,121 | 16.3 | 195,753 | 21.7 | 5.4 |
TX-32 | 439,551 | 67.6 | 422,818 | 66.0 | -1.5 | 235,626 | 36.2 | 271,442 | 42.4 | 6.2 |
Unfortunately, for some reason, while American Factfinder has “Hispanic or Latino by Race” available for entire states, the only data it currently has available at the CD level is the less precise “Race and Hispanic or Latino.” While that seems like a minor semantic distinction, this means there’s no way to parse out non-Hispanic white (and non-Hispanic black, etc.) for CDs. Bear in mind that “Hispanic,” for Census purposes, isn’t a race unto itself, but a box that gets checked in addition to race. So, while most people who check “Some other race” are Hispanic, not all Hispanics identify as “Some other race;” in fact, more than half of Hispanics identify as “white” (with most of the rest as “some other”) instead. This makes a big difference, in making the sample look whiter than it actually is (at least if one defines “white” in the narrow non-Hispanic sense). At the state level, in 2010, Texas appears as 70.4% white, 11.8% black, and 3.8% Asian in this format, in addition to 37.6% Hispanic. (Considering that adds up to 124%, it’s very confusing. Here, it’s also confusing because it makes districts with an already-large Hispanic majority look like they got even whiter, at the same time as they gained more Hispanics.) So, I’d focus more on the Hispanic column than on the white column in this table, and maybe I’ll revisit this when we get data on non-Hispanic whites.
More data over the flip…
Finally, here are tables for the African-American and Asian populations for each congressional district. While African-American growth is fairly slow (though seemingly faster than growth in non-Hispanic whites), the Asian growth in Texas is just as fast-paced as Hispanic growth (if not faster, in certain suburban districts).
District | 2000 black | Black % | 2010 black | Black % | % change | 2000 Asian | Asian % | 2010 Asian | Asian % | % change |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TX-01 | 120,705 | 18.5 | 127,714 | 17.7 | -0.9 | 3,256 | 0.5 | 6,487 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
TX-02 | 124,420 | 19.1 | 168,647 | 21.6 | 2.5 | 16,395 | 2.5 | 26,501 | 3.4 | 0.9 |
TX-03 | 59,496 | 9.1 | 97,376 | 11.6 | 2.4 | 54,246 | 8.3 | 102,783 | 12.2 | 3.9 |
TX-04 | 67,155 | 10.3 | 87,583 | 10.4 | 0.1 | 4,300 | 0.7 | 17,420 | 2.1 | 1.4 |
TX-05 | 80,743 | 12.4 | 100,881 | 13.9 | 1.5 | 10,365 | 1.6 | 14,086 | 1.9 | 0.3 |
TX-06 | 83,081 | 12.7 | 134,647 | 16.6 | 3.9 | 21,819 | 3.3 | 32,795 | 4.1 | 0.8 |
TX-07 | 36,603 | 5.6 | 78,428 | 10.0 | 4.4 | 44,670 | 6.9 | 79,224 | 10.1 | 3.3 |
TX-08 | 56,930 | 8.7 | 65,401 | 7.8 | -0.9 | 5,098 | 0.8 | 11,934 | 1.4 | 0.6 |
TX-09 | 244,295 | 37.5 | 262,525 | 35.8 | -1.7 | 69,533 | 10.7 | 79,853 | 10.9 | 0.2 |
TX-10 | 59,420 | 9.1 | 111,799 | 11.4 | 2.3 | 25,383 | 3.9 | 57,124 | 5.8 | 1.9 |
TX-11 | 26,925 | 4.1 | 28,410 | 4.0 | -0.1 | 3,527 | 0.5 | 5,222 | 0.7 | 0.2 |
TX-12 | 36,133 | 5.5 | 56,115 | 6.8 | 1.2 | 14,963 | 2.3 | 24,464 | 2.9 | 0.6 |
TX-13 | 36,690 | 5.6 | 39,620 | 5.9 | 0.3 | 7,762 | 1.2 | 11,586 | 1.7 | 0.5 |
TX-14 | 63,978 | 9.8 | 71,281 | 9.1 | -0.7 | 10,962 | 1.7 | 27,358 | 3.5 | 1.8 |
TX-15 | 12,020 | 1.8 | 12,169 | 1.5 | -0.3 | 3,588 | 0.6 | 6,854 | 0.9 | 0.3 |
TX-16 | 20,477 | 3.1 | 24,499 | 3.2 | 0.1 | 6,946 | 1.1 | 8,205 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
TX-17 | 67,278 | 10.3 | 74,834 | 9.8 | -0.5 | 9,434 | 1.4 | 15,071 | 2.0 | 0.5 |
TX-18 | 263,106 | 40.4 | 265,109 | 36.8 | -3.6 | 21,547 | 3.3 | 24,340 | 3.4 | 0.1 |
TX-19 | 35,845 | 5.5 | 39,777 | 5.7 | 0.2 | 5,521 | 0.8 | 8,840 | 1.3 | 0.5 |
TX-20 | 43,738 | 6.7 | 51,563 | 7.2 | 0.5 | 9,964 | 1.5 | 13,859 | 1.9 | 0.4 |
TX-21 | 41,027 | 6.3 | 57,403 | 6.7 | 0.4 | 16,805 | 2.6 | 32,375 | 3.8 | 1.2 |
TX-22 | 61,165 | 9.4 | 129,682 | 14.2 | 4.8 | 50,695 | 7.8 | 115,594 | 12.7 | 4.9 |
TX-23 | 18,617 | 2.9 | 29,870 | 3.5 | 0.7 | 6,650 | 1.0 | 16,040 | 1.9 | 0.9 |
TX-24 | 63,194 | 9.7 | 117,088 | 14.8 | 5.1 | 39,716 | 6.1 | 75,088 | 9.4 | 3.3 |
TX-25 | 63,750 | 9.8 | 64,042 | 7.9 | -1.9 | 12,146 | 1.9 | 18,460 | 2.3 | 0.4 |
TX-26 | 100,881 | 15.5 | 122,856 | 13.4 | -2.1 | 14,125 | 2.2 | 35,991 | 3.9 | 1.7 |
TX-27 | 17,084 | 2.6 | 17,385 | 2.3 | -0.3 | 5,091 | 0.8 | 8,837 | 1.2 | 0.4 |
TX-28 | 8,178 | 1.3 | 13,116 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 3,179 | 0.5 | 6,502 | 0.8 | 0.3 |
TX-29 | 65,414 | 10.0 | 68,630 | 10.1 | 0.1 | 8,492 | 1.3 | 7,826 | 1.2 | -0.1 |
TX-30 | 271,812 | 41.7 | 293,203 | 41.5 | -0.2 | 8,552 | 1.3 | 8,848 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
TX-31 | 84,561 | 13.0 | 113,076 | 12.5 | -0.5 | 14,275 | 2.2 | 31,047 | 3.4 | 1.2 |
TX-32 | 50,833 | 7.8 | 54,869 | 8.6 | 0.8 | 26,923 | 4.1 | 33,982 | 5.3 | 1.2 |
I was guessing that it would be 35% Hispanic.
Two of them were among the four statewide that lost population, another one had the second lowest growth.
The Hispanic growth in proportion to rest of the population is only going to accelerate. By my math Hispanics make up 48.3% of the Texan’s under 18 (33.6 % of the population over 18).
Looking at the numbers, I infer they mirror their vote for Republican candidates closely to Non-Hispanic whites.
Saw this last week:
http://www.texastribune.org/te…
and Yes Texas will be a big redistricting prize. Here’s how I see the map breaking hispanic wise
I personally don’t see another hispanic seat in Houston rather Congressman Green will find himself in a new seat. His current seat will be as hispanic as possible with him being in it. I suspect he might move but some ambitious hispanic legislator will take him on.
I think Travis county seat (Doggett) will be more hispanic perhaps not 50% but close.
I guess the numbers are shouting out for another Valley seat. I hesitated about this but I guess its evitable. I thought the GOP might try another plan and they still may but I guess we will see one more seat in the Valley. The Northern part of CD15 (not very hispanic) and the Nueces county (part) will form part of a seat for Farenthold to try to hold.
A new seat in the DFW area for hispanics
Concesco’s CD23 & the New valley seat will be on the edge of 68% hisppanic. They will try to find the most republican precincts they can for CD23 & whatever number the new CD gets.
So I am thinking two new CDs that will hispanic and two new GOP seats. Conseco will be in a 50-50 seat but if anyone can win he will. I doubt Farenthold survives the primary in his much more republican seat.
Latino share of the vote in Texas according to Exit Polls in the last 4 elections.
2010 17%
2008 20%
2006 15%
2004 20%
How high does it need to go for Democrats to start to have a shot statewide in Texas (assuming the Hispanic vote will favor the Democrats at least for a few more cycles) and how long until it gets there?
WA, OR, NV, UT, CO, MO, AL.
http://2010.census.gov/2010cen…
The West finally gets some love next week.
The 2008 exit poll showed an electorate that was 63% white, and only 20% Hispanic, compared to a census that says the population is 18 points less white and 18 points more Hispanic. In 2010 it was even worse, 67% white and only 17% Hispanic. The black vote actually recorded in exit polls a couple points above census both times, at 13%, with Asians 2-3 points below census. Of course some Hispanics are white and might have identified as such in an exit poll, and we don’t know how much of the disconnect comes from that. But I bet Hispanic whites aren’t a huge percentage in the census.
I imagine a large percentage of non-white Hispanics are documented or undocumented immigrants. Only when their children, including in the case undocumented immigrants their American-born children, reach their early 30s will we see an electorate that is only plurality white.
Texas Republicans have done a remarkable job os turnign the white vote so one-sidedly Republican that non-white vote growth hasn’t made a dent in elections. But Republicans finally have hit a wall, I don’t they’re not going to be able to make Texas like Mississippi or Alabama where the white vote for statewide Democrats can go down as low as the teens. Obama got 26% of the white vote in Texas, and Kerry got 25% the previous Presidential, so that’s pretty much the floor–basically about the same as in Georgia.
I think by 2024 or so, another dozen years, we’ll start seeing Texas a tough hold for Republicans in Presidentials; it could even by 2020, but I bet the electorate changes more slowly than that.
I figured the large influx of blacks from New Orleans into Houston after Katrina as well as Blacks moving to Texas to seek better jobs (or any jobs at all). I mean, where did Illinois blacks go? Their population % actually decreased there.
Anyone notice how off the Census estimates where for Houston and Dallas, in particular? If I remember the numbers correctly, they overestimated Houston proper by about 150,000 and Dallas by about 100,000. In fact, the rate of growth for Houston was less than half of what was predicted for the 2000-2009 estimate period.
Damn, I’m from Texas, but I definitely have not committed the districts to memory. So looking over these tables, I can only guess for half of them, if they are Deep East Texas Pineywoods or suburban Metroplex or the High Plains or what. (Can’t we, uh, not me — I lack all such skillz — but you, somebody, please!) imbed a map of districts to help make better sense of all this excellent analysis?
Interesting dialogue. Great insights, as far as Texas Hispanics being more conservative than in other areas. In the big cities in the Northeast, the Irish, Italians and other immigrant groups were Catholic and voted Democratic, but their children and grandchildren moved out to the suburbs and became Republicans, a lot of the time. Certainly Hispanics, who are also Catholic, would also seem to take the same path.
After the 2008 election, the obituaries were being written for the GOP, and after only 2 years, it all turned around, (Of course, after 2004, the obituaries were being written for the Democrats.) This time in history reminds me a lot of the late 1940’s and early 1950′, when the House and Senate flipped fairly often.
The Democrats (and I am one), we can’t just wait for the Republicans to screw up and hope the voters come back to them. I can easily foresee the House and Senate flipping a few more times over the next few election cycles. Ultimately, what we all want is leadership, and I really don’t see either side doing such a great job. They just sit and wait for the other party to mess up.
I do know that people (especially independent voters) will ultimately vote for someone who works hard and basically tries to do a decent job, regardless of party affiliation. Texas Dems have to offer an alternative, they can’t just sit and wait for more babies to come along.
a lot closer than we think. Obama will probably not win TX in 2012, but just as Kerry softened up CO in 2004 for a win in 2008, Obama will really soften up TX in 2012 for a DEM win in 2016 and beyond.
When the hispanic portion of the population goes over 42%, then with 12% black and 4% asian – then this state becomes a blue state.
Let’s assume among voters in 2016 that the breakdown would be so:
White: 51% (44% of state population)
Hispanic: 36% (42% of state population)
Black: 9% (12% of state population)
Asian: 3% (4.5% of state population)
other: 1% (including american indian)
If the DEM presidential candidate nails 70% of the non-white vote, then that is 34.3%. This means that in order to get over 50% overall, the DEM candidate needs only 30.9% of the white vote to get there. Obama already got 31% of the white vote in 2008.
Obama lost TX in 2008 by
11.76%. Alone, the increase in the hispanic population since then, if it will be reflected in registered voters who get out there and vote, will reduce that margin to as little as4%. Mark my words, TX becomes one of the next swing states in the Union. Not in 2012, but in 2016 and beyond.You can find the true Anglo percent here http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/red…
Also, the map (with deviations) which was requested upthread is here
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/red…
Finally, all things Texas redistricting are here
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/red…
here goes. There has been alot of talk about long term trends not only on this thread but others here.
I can remember as a teenager when the 18 year olds got the right to vote. The young people back then were so liberal and democratic because of cultural issues / Vietnam war. Plus the older folks were still clinging to their New Deal ties to the democratic party. Plus the AA voters were just now registering in significant numbers in the South and hispanics were starting to appear in some states. So in the early 1970’s political sciences were predicting a multi generational boom for the democrat party. After the 1974 elections people spectulated as to whether the GOP party might go the way of the whigs.
That generation of college kids from 1964 to 1974 had to been the most liberal until say perhaps the 2008 18-21 bloc.
So how did that 40 year projection work out in 1971? I guess we had the most conservative period of Presidents (1981 to 2009) since before TR plus more people identify themselves as republicans now. If I recall correctly it was +10D in 1971.
So I get a little leery when I read about people projecting long term political trends.