Tag: election analysis

This is the third part of a series of posts analyzing the swing state Pennsylvania. Part four can be found here.



Philadelphia’s Suburbs

There used to be a time when Republicans could count on Philadelphia’s suburbs to counter Democratic margins from the city. This is Philadelphia, circa 1988:

Not anymore. Philadelphia, 2008:

(Note: Because the Times stopped updating before all absentee/provisional ballots were counted, this map does not fully reflect the actual results. I have corrected the discrepancy.)

Indeed, in 2008 President Barack Obama’s suburban margins were so great that Democrats did not even need Philadelphia to win Pennsylvania.

Philadelphia’s suburbs stretch across four counties: Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery. Bucks contains more working-class, Catholic communities. Chester, on the other hand, is more exurban and conservative (in this century, Democrats have only incontrovertibly won the county twice – in 1964 and 2008).

More below.

The suburbs hold more importance than implied by the above maps, which tend to exaggerate Philadelphia’s size due to its one-sided voting pattern. While the city’s population continues its long, slow decline, its suburbs have grown at a rapid clip. Today, the number of votes they hold almost doubles the city’s reservoir.

While regional differences exist, Philly’s suburbs do have one thing in common: they compose the wealthiest area in the entire state. Chester, Bucks, and Montgomery Counties rank #1, #2, and #3 in the state’s median household income. They also lack diversity; the census classifies around 90% of Bucks County residents as non-Hispanic whites.

Given these characteristics, one might expect Philly’s suburbs to be rock-hard Republican strongholds. Until recently they did vote strongly Republican; Democrats only won the suburbs twice (in 1964 and – due to TR’s Bull Moose candidacy – 1912) before 1992. It was President Bill Clinton who changed this pattern; in 1992 he barely managed to turn Bucks, Delaware, and Montegomery blue (his greatest margin was 3.4%). Ever since then Democrats have been doing better and better.

This shift does not constitute an anomaly; Democratic candidates since Mr. Clinton have been winning a number of wealthy, white suburban counties that used to go strongly Republican. Before Clinton, Long Island and Westchester consistently gave Republicans double-digit margins; today they’ve voted Democratic for the past four consecutive elections. Detroit’s suburbs – Oakland and Macomb counties – have gone from Reagan Democrat fortresses to regions John Kerry tied. Senator John McCain barely won Orange County, that symbol of suburban Republican might.

Montgomery and Delaware counties are especially Democratic-friendly. They  identify more with the populous, sophisticated northeastern seaboard than the more conservative Midwest. As such, these counties by nature sympathize with liberal sentiment; George W. Bush lost both by double-digits. This does not necessary mean, however, that Montgomery and Delaware constitute bastions of acceptance; products of white flight from Philadelphia, they can at times be fairly hostile to people who are considered different.

Increasing Democratic strength in these well-off suburbs portends great trouble for Republicans. In 2008, Mr. Obama’s performance in Montgomery and Delaware counties eclipsed his suburban strength in practically every other swing state. Only suburbs in places like the Bay Area, Seattle, and New England voted more Democratic.

In total, Obama won the Philly suburbs by 15.56%. Combined with his landslide in the city itself, he came out of southeast Pennsylvania with a 682,392 vote margin. This meant that John McCain needed to win the rest of the state by 58.79%.

If Pennsylvania was like Missouri – if the remainder of the state voted strongly Republican – this might just have been possible. But Pennsylvania is not like Missouri; southwestern Pennsylvania used to be unchallenged Democratic territory, while Scranton, Erie, and the Lehigh Valley all lean Democratic. John McCain thus lost the state by double-digits.  His only successes occurred in southwestern Pennsylvania, which is reddening almost as quickly as the southeast is bluing.

–Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/

This is the second part of a series of posts analyzing the swing state Pennsylvania. The next part can be found here.

Like Florida, and unlike Ohio, Pennsylvania’s political geography can be divided into three. The industrial southwest is reddening, the populous southeast is bluing, and Pennsyltucky remains, as James Carville memorably described it, “Alabama without the blacks.” (Actually, Pennsyltucky is a fair bit less conservative.)

The following section will concentrate on Philadelphia, the region upon which Democrats draw the most votes.



Philadelphia the City

Although cities always vote Democratic, different cities contain different political characteristics. Not all big cities are liberal (see Houston, Phoenix), nor are all liberal cities are big (see San Francisco, Boulder).

Fortunately for Democrats, Philadelphia is both America’s sixth largest city and one in which four out of five inhabitants regularly choose the Democrat. It is, moreover, a city which has become bluer for eight straight elections.

(A note: All my statistics are taken from http://www.uselectionatlas.org/)

More below.

Philadelphia’s decades-long movement towards Democrats has corresponded with six decades of population decline; white flight has gradually weeded out Republican voters. Machine politics – characterized by such practices as street money – continues to play a major role in elections.

Demographics underlie Democratic strength in the city (as they do throughout American cities). A full 44.8% of the city’s population is black, a heavily Democratic voting bloc. Latinos (another Democratic voting bloc), while fewer than elsewhere, comprise a solid 11.8% of Philadelphia.

A large majority of Philadelphia’s white voters must vote Democratic, too. In 2008 Obama took 83% of the vote, in a city whose non-Hispanic white population was 39.0% according to the census. Assuming minority turn-out proportional to their actual population, and assuming every single non-white person voted Democratic, then at a minimum, 56.4% of Philadelphia whites supported Obama. Under a more realistic assumption (e.g. 90% non-whites voting Democratic), 72.08% of Philadelphia whites would be supporting Obama. (The equation to get this is simple: 83.01 = 0.90*61.00 + x*39.00).

Philadelphia’s white vote revolves around two factors: liberal whites moving in through gentrification, and long-standing white ethnic communities. The former voting group – often young, single, and gay or gay-friendly – is liberal by orientation; the latter group, a consequence of long-gone anti-Catholic sentiment, still votes Democratic on economic issues but is slowly treading Republican.

All in all, Philadelphia’s existence constitutes an enormous advantage for Democrats. For the past three presidential elections, it has been around 60% more Democratic than the nation as a whole. If George W. Bush had won 80% of the vote in 2008 (and John Kerry had won 20% of the vote), he still would have lost Philadelphia by 3.60%. That is a shocking (and sad) statistic. As long as Republicans keep on losing the city by 4-1 margins, they’ll have a very difficult time winning Pennsylvania as a whole.

Finally, notice how – for the first time in history – Philadelphia’s suburbs now lean Democratic. That shift, which I will cover next, should disturb even the most confident Republican.

–Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/

By: Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/

I think we all remember the 2008 Democratic primaries, that exciting and epic battle. In many ways the campaign caused more excitement than the general election, whose result was never really in doubt (especially after the financial crisis).

Both candidates drew upon distinctly different coalitions. In an influential article, Ronald Brownstein analyzes the difference this way:

Since the 1960s, Democratic nominating contests regularly have come down to a struggle between a candidate who draws support primarily from upscale, economically comfortable voters liberal on social and foreign policy issues, and a rival who relies mostly on downscale, financially strained voters drawn to populist economics and somewhat more conservative views on cultural and national security issues.

President Barack Obama assembled a coalition from the former, these “wine-track” Democrats. When most Americans think of liberals, they think of wine-track Democrats. Mr. Obama, then, was the liberal candidate; Mrs. Clinton the “beer-track,” working-class representative.

So candidate won the most liberal place in America?

In fact, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton won the state of Massachusetts (you may have realized this by reading the title of this post). The result wasn’t even close; Mrs. Clinton’s margin was 15.37%.

These results are most strange. Barack Obama supposedly built a coalition upon liberal Democrats – yet he lost Massachusetts, the very image of liberalism. He then proceeded to win the nomination.

I will attempt to explain this puzzling result below.

There are several elements to it. Firstly, the state Massachusetts does not contain as many wine-track Democrats as most Americans tend to think. Rather, it includes a number of working-class, beer-track Democrats. These voters support Democrats based upon economic issues (which is not to say they are socially conservative). The state holds a strong union presence along with a high percentage of Catholics, numbering almost half the population. While in many places Catholics no longer vote Democratic, in Massachusetts they still are loyal to the party. According to exit polls, Catholics (45% of voters) went for Clinton by a 2-1 margin, while union households (27% of voters) supported Clinton 60-35.

Nevertheless, Clinton’s overwhelming victory remains surprising. Taking working-class support for Clinton into account, one still would expect Obama to do relatively well.

Remember, however, that this is Hillary Clinton we are talking about. Hillary Clinton, the champion of women’s rights. Hillary Clinton, the powerful and polarizing First Lady conservatives absolutely hated. Though the memory has dimmed, Hillary Clinton once stood at the forefront of “wine-track” liberalism. In February 5th, 2008 many liberal Democrats still remembered Hillary the feminist. Only later did Hillary the working-class fighter emerge.

Moreover, at that time Barack Obama continued to be a relative unknown, a bolt of lightning who had come out of nowhere. Hillary Clinton, therefore, made substantial inroads into Obama’s coalition, just as Obama took away a central pillar of working-class Democrats (blacks). Exit polls indicated that 62% of women supported Clinton (36% supported Obama); progressive white women probably went for her even more strongly. Throughout the primaries, Jews and gays (both deeply liberal groups) tended to support Clinton.

I am not terribly satisfied with this analysis; it does not seem to fully explain how the most liberal state in the union supported the more conservative candidate. The result perplexes me even today.

Nor did Massachusetts constitute an anomaly; Clinton did well in other liberal areas. She and Obama, for instance essentially tied the San Francisco Bay Area:



Reasonable explanations behind this result also exist. Working-class Latinos gave Clinton strong support; thus her large margins in heavily Latino San Jose and Fresno. Moreover, upper-class Asians – a major Bay Area constituency – supported her 3-1.

Yet the fact remains that, out of the two most liberal regions in the nation, Hillary Clinton won a landslide in one and tied another (if one adds together the Bay Area’s nine metropolitan counties, Obama actually wins by 1.2%). All this against an opponent whose base lay amongst liberal Democrats. It is all very puzzling.

Note: All images are modified pictures taken from the NYT.

his is the eight in a series of diaries depicting the Democratic victory in this year’s midterm elections. Other diaries in this series can be seen here.

Already covered have been New England, NY, NJ, MD, and DE, PA, OH, IN, MI, and Wisconsin.

Today’s diary will focus on Illinois. As always first up are the seat control maps, no seats changed hands in Illinois.

Illinois

Chicago Metro Area

 

Of the 3,453,132 votes cast in the 2006 US House races in
Wisconsin,  1,986,431  votes (57.5%) were cast for Democratic candidates, while 1,443,076 votes (41.8%) were cast for Republicans.  Including unopposed races that Democrats had an 15.7% vote total advantage, a 3.9% improvement over 2004.  

2006 Vote Margins

The deepest blue indicates a Democratic vote share over 60%, medium blue 55-60%, light blue 50-55%, pink 45-50%, medium red 40-45%, deep red 40% or less.

As is clear from the map Cook county (Chicago) is both a Democratic powerhouse, and is not clear Cook County is by far the most populous county in the state.  With 2,710,118 registered voters, Cook County is home to over 1/3rd (36.7%) of registred voters in Illinois. Expanding to the full Chicago MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area, includes Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will counties) the Chicago area is home to 4,530,906 voters, or 61.4% of the state’s
registered voters. Excluding the Chicago area, Illinois bears a strong resemblance to Ohio and Indiana, with Republican areas in the center of the state, and ancestral Democratic districts in the southern part of the state.

The two closest races in the state were located in Chicago’s northwestern suburbs. In the closest race, the IL-06, Republican Peter Roskam scored a narrow  4,810 vote margin (2.7% ) over Iraq war vet Tammy Duckworth. In the IL-10, Democrat Dan Seals was defeated by Republican incumbent Mark Kirk by  14,731 vote margin (6.8%).  

Turning to vote shar gainse between the 2004 and 2006 elections, the IL-10 saw the Democratic vote share surge.

2006 Vote Gains

The deepest blue indicates a Democratic vote gain of over 10%, medium blue 5-10%, light blue 0-5%, pink 0 to -5%, medium red -5 to -10%, deep red -10% or less.

The IL-02 and IL-12 are both grayed out because in one of the two years the district was uncontested. Again, the most impressive Democratic vote gain was in the IL-10 where the Democratic vote share rose from 35.7% in 2004 to 46.6%.  As well, Democrats in both the IL-14 and IL-18 saw the Democratic vote share rise by 6.8%, with Democratic candidates raising vote totals from the low
30’s in 2004 to just around 40% this year. In general, while the Chicago area is largely a static area as Democratic vote shares top out as the area has been transformed to a Democratic stronghold, downstate and in the river counties there is a still a large potential for growth.

As a result of this dynamic, further gains in the Chicago area will likely come from get out the vote campaigns, while downstate populist economic messages might offer the potential to convert rural Republicans worried about the exodus of factory jobs that have hit the state.

Looking at differences in turnout between 2004 and 2006, something very important about the Chicago area emerges.

2004

2006

These maps show deviation from statewide turnout. The deepest blue indicates a turnout of 10% or more over the state average, medium blue 5-10%, light blue 0-5%, pink 0 to-5%, medium red -5 to -10%, deep red -10% or less of the statewide turnout average.

Statewide turnout in the 2006 election was 48.6%, a 22.7% drop off from the 2004 turnout at 71.6%.  The most obvious change between the two years comes in the Chicago area with turnout in Cook County and neighoring DuPage and Will counties turnout dropping by more than a quarter. With victory in the Chicago are largely falling to the effectiveness of campaigns in turning out the vote, this augurs well for Democratic opponents in the IL-06 and IL-10 in 2008.  As turnout in these counties increases due to the presidential election in 2008, Democrats downticket in the Chicago area stand to benefit.  Looking at this another way, below I’ve created a map that demonstrates the midterm dropoff.

Midterm dropoff
Shading indicates deviation from 2006 statewide dropoff of 22.7% from 2004 election. The deepest blue indicates a dropoff of 10% or more over the state average, medium blue 5-10%, light blue 0-5%, pink 0 to-5%, medium red -5 to -10%, deep red -10% or less  

On this map, the more blue the county is shaded the less variation in turnout between 2004 and 2006.  More so than the other maps this shows the magnitude of the midterm dropoff effect in the Chicago area.  While turnout in Chicago are dropped by more than a quarter, downstate while turnout did drop, it did so only by about 10%.  Thus, the biggest driver behind the midterm effect in Illinois was the Chicago region.  Basically, what emerges is a divide between urban Chicago where turnout determines who wins elections, while downstate victory will depend on the ability of Democrats to win over enough Republican voters to overcome the slight Republican lean of much of the region. Using the vote share totals from the Comptroller, Secretary of State, and Treasurer races, I’ve created a measure of base Democratic performnace,which I’ve mapped below.

The deepest blue indicates a base Democratic vote share over 60%, medium blue 55-60%, light blue 50-55%, pink 45-50%, medium red 40-45%, deep red 40% or less.

Top 5 Democrat Counties

County        % DEM  Region

Cook        74.6%  Chicago
Gallatin    68.0%  Southern
Calhoun        65.0%  Western
Rock Island    64.5%  Western
Alexander    64.1%  Southern

Bottom 5 Democrat Counties       

County        % DEM  Region

Ford        31.5%    Central
Iroquios    33.4%   Central
Livingston        34.2%    Central
Woodford    35.0%   Central
McClean        39.6%   Central

Again, Cook County emerges as the deepest blue part of the state.  Other areas of Democratic strenght can be found in the Rock Island, East St Louis, and Cairo areas. Republican strenth is concentrated in the east central area of the state, with most of the red areas of the state being competitive.  Slightly more than 5% of Illinois voters live in counties where Republicans, as measured by base partisanship, constitute more than 55% of the electorate.  While Democrats have grown incredildly strong in the Chicago area, for the most part in the rest of the state Democratic congressional candidates significantly underperformed the base partisanship.

Congressional Democratic Performance
The deepest blue indicates a Democratic congressional vote share over 10% or more over the base, medium blue 5-10%, light blue 0-5%, pink 0-5%, medium red -5-10%, deep red -10% or less.

Counties included in the IL-12 are grayed out because the Democrat in that district ran unopposed.  Looking at the state, it’s clear that Democratic candidates have significant room for growth throughout the state.  The measure of base partisanship I’ve constructed is the mean of three low profile state races where voters most often vote for the party rather than the person.  While many people use the Presidential or Governor vote share as a measure of partisanship, that is misleading.  Because the purpose of a measure of base partisanship is measure the effect of party cues on voters, yet in those high profile races party cues play very little role in determining vote choice. In low profile state races party cues constitute the principal way in which voters choose who to vote for.

Looking back on what we’ve covered today, two themes emerge.  

1. Chicago is a mature electorate.  In Cook County, Democrats are dominant, and the large dropoff in midterm elections augurs well for 2008.

2.  In the rest of the state, Democrats are underperforming by a large margin.  Voters who lean Democratic, voting for Democratic candidate for Secretary of State, Comptroller, and Treasurer, are not voting for Congressional Democrats. Democrats took 57.8% of the state’s congressional vote, and constitute 60.3% of the state’s electorate when using base partisanship measures. If Democrats succeed in breaking through to rural voters who choose Democrats for low profile races, but give their vote to Republicans for Congress 2-3 seats above and beyond those identified earlier could come into play.

In this series I have created a race tier system that is I will explain in the next few sentences. Tier 0 races are those where the Democratic candidate won by a margin of less than 5%, the presumption being that incumbency grants an advantage of 5-10% that with the fundraising advantage that comes with holding office should be sufficient for these candidates to defend their seats without funding from the party.  The assumption that incumbency gives a 5-10% advantage drives the classification of the pickup categories.  Tier 1 races are those where the incumbent won by less than 5% in 2006, while tier 2 races are those where Republicans won by less than 10%. Looking at Illinois there is one Tier 1 race, and one Tier 2 race.

Tier 0

Race   D%       R%        Margin        2006 D Cand.

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

Tier 1

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

IL-06     48.6    51.4   2.7%      Tammy Duckworth

Tier 2

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

IL-10     46.6    53.4   6.8%      Dan Seals

And finally the running totals for the series.

Tier 0 (5)

CT-02, NY-19, NH-1, IN-09, WI-08

Tier 1 (10)

CT-04, IL-06, NJ-07, NY-25, NY-26, NY-29, OH-2, OH-15, PA-06, MI-07

Tier 2 (5)

OH-01, PA-15, IL-10, IN-03, MI-09

States Covered

CT, IL,IN, MA, MD,ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH,PA, RI, WI, VT

This is the eight in a series of diaries depicting the Democratic victory in this year’s midterm elections. Other diaries in this series can be seen here.

Already covered have been New England, NY, NJ, MD, and DE, PA, OH, IN, and Michigan.

Today’s diary will focus on Wisconsin. As always first up are the seat control maps.

2004

2006

Of the  1,852,619 votes cast in the 2006 US House races in Wisconsin,  1,001,254 votes (54%) were cast for Democratic candidates, while  836,054 votes (45.1%) were cast for Republicans.  Including unopposed races that Democrats had an 8.9% vote total advantage, a 5.1% improvement over 2004.  

2006 vote totals for the the race in the WI-06 are not currently available online, so the numbers above don’t include that district.

2006 Vote Margins

The deepest blue indicates a Democratic vote share over 60%, medium blue 55-60%, light blue 50-55%, pink 45-50%, medium red 40-45%, deep red 40% or less.

Democrat Steve Kagen won in the open seat in the WI-08 defeating Republican State Assembly Speaker John Gard by 6,608 votes (2.4%).  This represents a 21.4% surge over the 2004 Democratic vote share (29.8%) in this district.  Coming in at over $4 Million , Democrat Steve Kagen spent $1.7 Million of his own money outspending Republican John Gard by over $100,000.

All other races in Wisconsin were won by margins of over 10%.

2006 Vote Gains

The deepest blue indicates a Democratic vote gain of over 10%, medium blue 5-10%, light blue 0-5%, pink 0 to-5%, medium red -5 to -10%, deep red -10% or less.

2006 vote totals for the WI-06 where the Republican went unchallenged are unavailble, and the WI-07 is grayed out because there was no 2004 Republican challenger.

The most impressive vote gain was in the WI-08 as was mentioned above. In the WI-02, there was a 0.4% shift towards the Republican, while  Democrats made an 8.4% gain in the WI-02, yielding  much large Democratic margin of victory than in 2004.  In the Milwaukee suburbs, Democrats made 4.8% and 4% gains in the WI-01 and WI-05 respectively.  However, the Republican margin of victory in these districts was over 25% in 2006.

In this series I have created a race tier system that is I will explain in the next few sentences. Tier 0 races are those where the Democratic candidate won by a margin of less than 5%, the presumption being that incumbency grants an advantage of 5-10% that with the fundraising advantage that comes with holding office should be sufficient for these candidates to defend their seats without funding from the party.  The assumption that incumbency gives a 5-10% advantage drives the classification of the pickup categories.  Tier 1 races are those where the incumbent won by less than 5% in 2006, while tier 2 races are those where Republicans won by less than 10%.  It’s really quite simple.

Tier 0

Race   D%       R%        Margin        2006 D Cand.

WI-08  51.2%   48.8%      2.4%          Steve Kagen  

Tier 1

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

Tier 2

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

And finally the running totals for the series.

Tier 0 (5)

CT-02, NY-19, NH-1, IN-09, WI-08

Tier 1 (9)

CT-04, NJ-07, NY-25, NY-26, NY-29, OH-2, OH-15, PA-06, MI-07

Tier 2 (4)

OH-01, PA-15, IN-03, MI-09

States Covered

CT, IN, MA, MD,ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH,PA, RI, WI, VT

This is the sixth in a series of diaries depicting the Democratic victory in this year’s midterm elections.

Already covered have been New England, NY, NJ, MD, and DE, PA, OH, and Indiana.

Today’s diary will focus on Michigan.  As always first up are the seat control maps, and in this case there’s only one map because no seats changed hands in 2006.

2004 & 2006

Of the  3,646,436 votes cast in the 2006 US House races in Michigan,  1,922,808 votes (52.7%) were cast for Democratic candidates, while  1,626,399 votes (48.4%) were cast for Republicans.  Including races that the Repubicans didn’t oppose in 2006, this represents a 4.1% shift from 2004, excluding the two Detroit races Republicans choose not to oppose in 2006 the modified Democratic vote share at 48.4% represents a 3.1% shift  over totals in the same 13 races in 2004. As stated above no seats changed hands.

Democrats took 6 (40%) of Michigan’s 15 Congressional districts while winning 48.4% of the state Congressional vote, rising to 52.7% if totals from the two Detroit districts left unopposed by Republicans are included. If seats were apportioned according to vote totals, i.e. proportional representation,  Compare this to Indiana where Democrats took 55.5% of the state’s Congressional seats while winning only 48.5% of the state Congressional vote.  

The difference?  

Democrats controlled redistricting in Indiana, while Republicans controlled the redistricting process in Michigan in 2000. While Democrats control both the governor’s offices and the Michigan House, Republicans retained control of the Michigan Senate.  With the redistricting process controlled by the legislature, this points to the need to put the press on Republican Michigan Senators for 2008.  However, attmempts at redistricting at this point probably would do more harm than good.  Using the fairer Democratic performace standard I’ve created below, we find that statewide Democratic performance  is at 51.8% which if reflected in the distribution of Congressional seats would create two new Congressional seats for the Democratic party.

The 50 State Strategy can’t be a one hit wonder, we have to work to get Democratic candidates elected at all levels.  If we do we’ll have strong candidates to run for office in other races.  We need to build a farm league, officeholders who’ve already represented part of the district at a another level of government who can run for Congress.  Half the fight for a challenger is getting the public to recognize your name.  If you’ve got someone who’s familiar from having already held office you’ve got a running start.  This is how the Republicans win, they build up networks that stay in place long after any one race has been finished.  

Senators and Congressional representatives who have large warchests should be asked to pay an apportionment to state parties.  And we need strong competition within the party organization to ensure that state parties aren’t controlled by a few wealthy donors to the detriment of the working public.

Returning to Michigan, there’s hope that we can take two Congressional districts without redistricting.  While there were no Congressional pickups in Michigan, Democratic candidates came within striking distance in the MI-07 and MI-09.

2006 Vote Margins
The deepest blue indicates a Democratic victory of over 60%, medium blue 55-60%, light blue 50-55%, pink 45-50%, medium red 40-45%, deep red 40% or less.

In the MI-07, Club for Growth Republican candidate Tim Walberg defeated the incumbent Republican candidate Joe Schwarz in the August primary. Walberg’s campaign faced contreversy in late October when a local paper revealed that a Walberg aide had pled guilty to child abuse charges in September.  Walberg won with a narrow 10,0017 (4.1%) margin over Democratic candidate Sharon Marie Renier.  While measures of base partisanship show that the western edge of the district leans Republican, vote totals from the Governor’s race show the impact that a high profile race with a winning message can have in the area, turning red to blue.

The second pickup opportunity for 2008 lies in the in the I-09 where incumbent Republican Joe Knollenberg faced a strong challenge from Democratic candidate Nancy Skinner.  Despite winning his district by a 18.9% margin in 2004, a poll taken in August showed Knollenberg in deep trouble.  Well under 50%, Knollenberg was running at 44% to Skinner’s 40%.  In a district dominated by the auto industry, Knollenberg’s postions for NAFTA and steel tarriffs that hurt domestic auto production ran showed a disconnect with the people back home.  Knollenberg’s 14628 (5.3%) vote margin yielded a narrow 51.5% victory him, and a great big target on his seat for 2008.

2006 Vote Gains
The deepest blue indicates a Democratic vote gain of over 10%, medium blue 5-10%, light blue 0-5%, pink 0 to-5%, medium red -5 to -10%, deep red -10% or less.

If there’s a lesson to be learned from Michigan it’s that a Democratic message that focuses on confronting the very real problems presented by corporate globalization and the dismembering of state regulatory regimes that protected workers, consumers, and the environment is a winner. Our two greatest surges came in the already mentioned MI-07 where the Democratic candidate surged by 10.1% over the 2004 Democratic performance at 36.3%.  In the MI-09, Skinner rose 6.7% over the 39.5% Democratic candidate showing in 2004. We need a populist economic message if we want to make gains in 2008.

There’s a war brewing in the party right now because of this.
Sirota’s right when he goes after the lack of geographic diversity among the pundit class and the subsequent impact that this has on the polical dialogue in this country.  We need people like Sherrod Brown to make trade an issue.  Even more damning is the piece written by Gjohnsit noting that 27 of the 29 Democratic pickups this year came from the defeat of “free trade” Republicans.  And back in Michigan, our biggest gains came against Republicans toeing to neo-liberal economic policy framework that working people don’t want.  If the Democratic leadership and the pundit clases can’t get the message they need to have their asses shipped off to the unemployment line.  Turnabout’s fair play, let’s see how they like it when they spend a year without a paying job.

But the war in the party brews, I may have to stop to take a break from the Graphic Anatomy of victory series to give this  the treatment this deserves later this week.

The point is that Democrats can win in rural areas.  Looking at a map of base Democratic performance in Michigan we see that except for the Upper Peninsula, Democratic strength is largely held in the Detroit metro area.

2006 Base Partisanship
The deepest blue indicates a Democratic base partisanship of over 60%, medium blue 55-60%, light blue 50-55%, pink 45-50%, medium red 40-45%, deep red 40% or less.

The measure of base partisanship is predicated on a belief in the role of information in politics.  Basically, where voters are unfamilar with candidates and issues they rely upon party to make their decision.  Most of us have had the moment in the polling booth when we get down to low profile races like Clerk of Courts, and having not a clue to either the candidate’s running or the issues at hand we vote the only way we know how, by party designation.  I’m planning to develop a more thorough measure that looks for low profile state races where total spending per capita was low to calculate means that give us an idea of how people vote with no other information but party.

To create the measure I’ve displayed on the map above, I took  the mean of Democratic vote share (note that all races elect 2 candidates) in the Wayne State University Board of Governors, Michigan State University Board of Trustees, and University of Michigan Board of Regents races.

Top 5 Dem Michigan Counties

CTY         Area        Base Democratic Vote

WAYNE     Detroit       69.8%
GENESEE   Detroit       62.9%
GOGEBIC   Upper Pen.    60.5%
WASHTENAW Detroit       60.2%
MARQUETTE Upper Pen.    59.4%

As you can see Democratic strength is concentrated in the Detroit metro area, and the parts of the Upper Peninsula near Wisconsion.  The Upper Peninsula is was dominated by the mining industry at the beginning of the 20th century, and continues to have a large forestry industry.  Also this is the the only area in the US where a Finnish ancestry dominates.  In many ways the Upper Peninsula belongs more culturally and demographically to Wisconsin and Minnesota than it does to Michigan.

While the red swath in western Michigan may look unconquerable, results from the 2006 Governor’s race where Democrat Jennifer Granholm prevailed prevailed over Republican Dick DeVos.  Granholm took 56.3% of the vote with DeVos taking only 42.3% of the vote despite having spent  almost $40 million of largely his own money attempting to unseat Granholm.  De Vos is heir to the Amway fortune, and was attacked by the AFL-CIO for outsourcing Michigan jobs, and has a long record of support for neo-liberal economic policies on trade and education. Looking at the returns from the 2006 Governor’s race Granholm was able to garner strong support in strongly Republican areas.

2006 Governor’s Race
The deepest blue indicates a Democratic victory of over 60%, medium blue 55-60%, light blue 50-55%, pink 45-50%, medium red 40-45%, deep red 40% or less.

Granholm’s most dramatic gains were in the Upper Peninsula where she outperformed the base Democratic vote by 16.1% in Luce county, and in the Kalamazoo area where she performed 9.6% over the base Democratic vote.  Statewide Granholm only performed 4.6% over the base Democratic vote, however her overperformace was concentrated in Republican areas denying De Vos his Republican base.

Tier 0

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

Tier 1

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

MI-07     46.4    50.5   4.1       Sharon Marie Renier

Tier 2

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

MI-09     46.2    51.5   5.3       Nancy Skinner

And finally the running totals for the series.

Tier 0 (4)

CT-02, NY-19, NH-1, IN-09

Tier 1 (9)

CT-04, NJ-07, NY-25, NY-26, NY-29, OH-2, OH-15, PA-06, MI-07

Tier 2 (4)

OH-01, PA-15, IN-03, MI-09

States Covered

CT, IN, MA, MD,ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH,PA, RI, VT

This is the sixth in a series of diaries depicting the Democratic victory in this year’s midterm elections.

Already covered have been New England, NY, NJ, MD, and DE, PA, and Ohio.

Today’s diary will focus on my Indiana, my home state, and will be a bit larger than usual for that reason.  As always first up are the seat control maps.

2004

2006

Of the  1,641,726 votes cast in the 2006 US House races in Indiana, 798,322 votes (48.5%) were cast for Democratic candidates, while  821,661 votes (50%) were cast for Republicans.  Statwide this represents a 7.3% shift to Democrats from the 2004 US House vote. Democrats went from holding 2 seats (22.2%) with 41.3% of the vote in 2004, to holding 5 seats (55.5%) with 48.5% of the vote in 2006. Compared this to Ohio where Democrats took 52.4% of the vote yet won only 38.9% of the state’s congressional seats.  The key difference is who controlled state government in 2001.  

In Indiana Democrats drew the maps, while in Ohio Republicans where the ones who drew the lines. The sad truth is if Democrats hadn’t been packed into the IN-08 in anticipation of creating a super safe seat for a prominent Democrat who never ran, we probably could have taken another seat by drawing districts that packed Republicans into super Republican seats in the Indianapolis suburbs.

Voter Turnout by County, Indiana 2006 General

This map shows deviation from the statewide turnout at 37%
The darkest shade of red indicates a turnout of 10% or more below the state average, medium red 10%-5%, pink less than 5% below, light blue less than 5% above, medium blue less than 10% above, dark blue more than 10% over the state average.

As the map shows turnout was strongest in the IN-08 and IN-02 where Democrats defeated Repubican incumbents, and weakest in Lake County, a Democractic stronghold, and Marion county where Julia Carson was faced blowback from revealing her opponent’s police record for domestic abuse and voting machine problems that led to some precincts not opening for several hours.  Given the nature of the economy in Indianapolis, voters were most likely disnefranchised because they were unable to vote before their 8-9 AM start time at work.  This may have contributed to the extremely narrow defeat (7 votes, pending recount) of incumbent Democratic State Representative Ed Mahern to an up start Republican challenger in HD-97 on Indianapolis’s south side.  Especially ironic is that Mahern is the man who was in charge of drawing the Congressional and state House maps in 2001.  He did a good job, and even more so the nameless staffer who made our victory in 2006 possible with good maps.

Looking at our 3 victories in Indiana we see that for Congressional races, the Hoosier state is a swing state.

In the IN-02, Democrat Joe Donelly defeated Republican incument Chris Chocola by 15,213 votes (7.9%), a 9.4 % improvement over the share of the vote Donelly took in 2004.

In the IN-08, Democrat Brad Ellsworth, former Vanderbugh county (Evansville) sherriff, blew away Republican incument John Hostetler winning by 45,593 votes (21.4%), a 16.1% improvement over the share the 2004 Democratic candidate took.  The next time Hostettler gets the bright idea to take a gun onto a plane, I suppose he’ll get a gloved hand up his ass like the rest of us would if we were that fucking arrogant.

In the IN-09, Baron Hill is the once again Democratic representative, taking back his seat from Republican incumbent Mike Sodrel with a 9,734 vote margin (4.4%), a 1% improvement over his performance in 2004.  You can thank the Libertarian party for this one.  If not for the 9954 votes taken by the Libertarian candidate, Hill would almost certainly have lost.  This is why we need to focus less on pretending that Democrats are Libertarians, and recognize them for what they are.  Useful idiots.  I’m all for supporting Libertarian candidates running against Republican incumbents, because when the hard truth is revealed and Republican voters realize their candidates are arrogant and incompetent the Libertarians will be there to give them a way to vote without giving the Republican a vote.  Useful idiots, enough said.

The following map shows Democratic 2006 gains over their 2004 Democratic performance in the district (in % terms), improvements of less than 5% will be displayed in light blue, under 10% in the darker blue, and over 10% in the darkest blue.  Republican gains will be shown in the same manner, with the light red signifying a gain of less than 5% and so on.

Looking more closely at the margin of victory in 2006 races,      Democratic defends and pickup opportunities emerge, the following map displays the margin of victory in 2006 races.  The deepest blue represents and Democratic margin of victory over 10%, the medium color represent more than 5%, while the lightest blue indicates that the Democratic candidate won by less than 5%.  Corresponding measures of Republican victory margins display progressively darker shades of red at the same intervals.

What emerges is a map to guide our 2008 strategy. In this series I have created a race tier system that is I will explain in the next few sentences. Tier 0 races are those where the Democratic candidate won by a margin of less than 5%, the presumption being that incumbency grants an advantage of 5-10% that with the fundraising advantage that comes with holding office should be sufficient for these candidates to defend their seats without funding from the party.  The assumption that incumbency gives a 5-10% advantage drives the classification of the pickup categories.  Tier 1 races are those where the incumbent won by less than 5% in 2006, while tier 2 races are those where Republicans won by less than 10%.  It’s really quite simple.

Tier 0

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

IN-09     50.0    45.5   4.4       Baron Hill

Tier 1

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

Tier 2

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

IN-03     45.7    54.3    8.6      Dr. Tom Hayhurst    

Before I close for the day, I’d like to give you a peek into some deeper measures that take alot of time and effort to calculate.  First, I’d like to dispel a Kossack myth.  

Presidential Vote≠Party Vote

This has to be the single worst myth I see circulating here, and it’s incredibly destructive because it fuels a mentality that we can’t compete in districts that voted for President Bush.  Ignoring that many indepedent voters who go for local Democrats are turned off when the Democratic party gives them the scion of an elite East Coast family that doesn’t know to carry his own fucking bird out of the forest but does windsurf.

Beyond that there’s a deeper phenomena at work here.  The Presidential race is the single most salient race in the the US, most voters have at least some clue to the positions of the candidate and th principal determinant of vote choice is the person and not the party.  Because voters are given lots of free inforation about the candidates that they can’t help but come into contact with they know who they are voting for (or against).  Downticket most voters have no friggin clue what the the state auditor does, let alone what the relevant positions are.  The have no idea who they are voting for, they use the party id to decide.  This is why this is the most relevant measure of base partisanship, and why the Cook Report PVI is deeply flawed.  This tells us how voters will vote if they know nothing about the candidates other than their names, which many voters do well into October.

I’ve constructed a measure of base partisanship using 2006 Indiana election data at the county level.  The measure, 3DMEAN, is the mean of the Democratic % in the Auditor, Secretary of State, and Treasurer races.  The state as a whole has a base Democratic parisanship of 47%.  To keep things simple I’ve used the same color coding I used on the margin maps. The darkest shade of red indicates a Democratic base partisanship of less than 40%, medium red 40-45%, pink 45-50%, light blue 50-55%, medium blue 55-60%, dark blue more than 60%.

Top 5 Democratic Counties

CTY          County Seat    3DMEAN

Lake         Crown Point           67%
Vermillion   Newport        67%
Perry        Tell City      66%
Sullivan     Sullivan       63%
Scott        Scottsburg     61%

Bottom 5 Democratic Counties

CTY          County Seat    3DMEAN

Boone        Lebanon        28%
Hamilton     Noblesvilee    28%
Kosciusko    Warsaw         30%
Hancock      Greenfield     32%
Montgomery   Crawfordsville 34%

From this two major phenomena emerge.  Much to the suprise of non-Hoosier, the Democratic credentials of rural Southern Indiana emerge, while the ring of death that surrounds Indianapolis and consumed Fort Wayne attacs the idea that Democrats can compete in the suburbs but not in rural America.  Another big suprise for many people is just how much Democratic strength there is in the IN-06 where two light blue counties (Madison/Anderson and Delaware/Muncie represent around half the registered voters in the district.  And unlike the deep red in other areas, the other counties of the IN-06 lean GOP by less than 5%.  However, Democratic candidates have consisently underperformed here as a result of low name recognition and low funding.

Below is a map detailing the deviation between Congressional vote percentages and the 3DMEAN, showing the degree to which the Democratic Congressional candidate under or overperformed the county base Democratic partisanship.  Dark red is -10% or more, medium red -5% to-10%, light red 0 to -5%, light blue to +5%, medium blue +5 to +10%, and dark blue +10% or more.

Democrats overperformed in most of the districts we won as well as the IN-03, and IN-04, while they underperformed in the IN-05, IN-06, and IN-09.  Underperformance in the IN-05, and IN-06 can be discounted by noting that Democratic challenegers were extremely poorly funded in these areas.  In the IN-06 Barry Welsh was outspent more than 20 to 1 by Mike Pence.  What is truly disspointing is the piss poor performance of Baron Hill in the IN-09 where he underperformed in almost all of the counties.  2006 was an anti-incumbent wave in Indiana, and it nearly cost Julia Carson and Baron Hill their elections.  Hill represented his district for 6 years before being defeated in 2004.  Hill’s problem is that even after spending more than a million dollars he can’t get Democrats to vote for him. For this reason it’s entirely plausible than Hill will need to be kept alive by the party in 2008.

On a happier note, I want to point out that in contrast to being a surge that we can’t match in 2008, the divergence between Democratic partisanship and performance measures in the IN-06, and the close election this year in the IN-03 show that we have room to grow.  During the early 1990s both areas were represented by Democrats Phil Sharp, and Jill Long, respectively.  What we’ve done is 2006 in Indiana is take us back to the place we were in 2000, if we keep pressing we can go back to where we were in 1992.

And finally the running totals for the series.

Tier 0

CT-02, NY-19, NH-1, IN-09

Tier 1

CT-04, NJ-07, NY-25, NY-26, NY-29, OH-2, OH-15, PA-06,

Tier 2

OH-01, PA-15, IN-03

States Covered

CT, IN, MA, MD,ME, NH, NJ, NY, OH,PA, RI, VT

This is the fifth in a series of diaries depicting the Democratic victory in this year’s midterm elections.

Already covered have been New England, NY, NJ/MD/DE, and Pennsylvania.

Today’s diary will focus on the Buckeye state, where we find that there must be something in the water, any water.  We know that the coasts lean blue, but this is also increasingly true of Ohio River Valley.First up are the seat control charts, and yes grey means that the race is still in dispute not that some third party won.

Of   3,757,640  votes cast in 2006 US House races in Ohio,    1,970,127 (52.4%) were cast for Democrats, while 1,779,461 (47.4%) were cast for Republicans. While the only  certified Democratic pickup is in the OH-18, two other races the OH-15 and OH-02 are both still in dispute, Democrats now hold 7 (38.9%) of Ohio’s 18 Congressional districts.  

While it is neccessary to remember that seats are apportioned according to population not voter registration, and that differing turnouts mean that state totals weigh some districts more heavily than others because of these differences the degree of gerrymandering is apparent in the disparity between vote totals and the party control of seats.  The problem is that the composition of Ohio’s House of Representatives delegation isn’t very representative of the voting intentions.  

If Ohio’s House delegation were apportioned by proportional representation, Democrats would control 9 of Ohio’s 18 House seats.  Dependent on the outcome of recounts in the OH-15 and OH-02, this may still come to pass.  I’d like to point out something I found highly disturbing when researching this diary.  On the election results page of the Ohio Secretary of State page, provisional ballot totals and percentages of provisional counted as valid are given for 2004, while the 2006 results give an aggregate figure for provisionals and absentee ballots.  

I find this highly suspicous, and this technicality has the stink of bullshit upon it, because it could serve to obscure the true quantity of provisionals ballots in the two contested districts.  And this could serve to obscure evidence of voter suppression in  the application of Ohio’s new voter ID law.  The Secretary of State’s office needs to release disaggregated figures listing the number of provisional ballots seperate from absentee ballots.

Voter Turnout by County, Ohio 2006 General

The darkest shade of red indicates a turnout of less than 40%, medium red 40-45%, pink 45-50%, light blue 50-55%, medium blue 55-60%, dark blue more than 60%.

Looking at our only confirmed victory, the OH-18, we can see  a general trend, areas with the highest turnout (the Toledo area and SE Ohio) tend to be the areas where Democrats won, while lowest turnout was reported in the Cincinnati area where Republicans narrowly won.  The Democratic victory in the OH-18 by Democrat Zack Space represents a real blow to Republicans.  In 2006, Space took 62% of the district vote for a 23.9% margin over Republican Joy Padgett.  This represents a 28.1% improvement the 33.9% 2004 Democratic vote share. This is Bob Ney’s old seat, this is what happens when the incumbent congressman is serving prison time. This is what a wave looks like. Bye-bye Republicans.

The following map shows Democratic 2006 gains over their 2004 Democratic performance in the district (in % terms), improvements of less than 5% will be displayed in light blue, under 10% in the darker blue, and over 10% in the darkest blue.  Republican gains will be shown in the same manner, with the light red signifying a gain of less than 5% and so on. Races that were not contested in either of the years will be displayed in gray.

Looking more closely at the margin of victory in 2006 races,      Democratic defends and pickup opportunities emerge, the following map displays the margin of victory in 2006 races.  The deepest blue represents and Democratic margin of victory over 10%, the medium color represent more than 5%, while the lightest blue indicates that the Democratic candidate won by less than 5%.  Corresponding measures of Republican victory margins display progressively darker shades of red at the same intervals.

What emerges is a map to guide our 2008 strategy. In this series I have created a race tier system that is I will explain in the next few sentences.Tier 0 races are those where the Democratic candidate won by a margin of less than 5%, the presumption being that incumbency grants an advantage of 5-10% that with the fundraising advantage that comes with holding office should be sufficient for these candidates to defend their seats without funding from the party.  The assumption that incumbency gives a 5-10% advantage drives the classification of the pickup categories.  Tier 1 races are those where the incumbent won by less than 5% in 2006, while tier 2 races are those where Republicans won by less than 10%.  It’s really quite simple.

Tier 0

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

Tier 1

Race    D%    R%    Margin    2006 D Cand.

OH-2    49.4  50.6  1.3       Victoria Wulsin

OH-15   49.1  50.9  1.8       Mary Jo Kilroy

Tier 2

Race    D%    R%    Margin    2006 D Cand.

OH-01   47.2  52.8  5.6       John Cranley

One final thing that I’d like to point out before we head to the running totals for 2008 tiers is the result of Ohio’s minimum wage ballot measure. Of 3,607,184 votes cast, 2,025,997 (56.2%) voted for the measure, while 1,581,187 (43.8%) voted against the measure.  Overall, support was strongest where Democrats won in the Ohio River Valley and on the Lake Erie coast. The yes vote was the highest in Lawrence county in SE Ohio where 71.2% voted yes, and lowest in central Ohio’s Holmes county where only 31.2% voted for the minimum wage measure.

I’ve created chart below to keep a running total of races that I’ve classifed in each tier for 2008.

Tier 0

CT-02, NY-19, NH-1

Tier 1

CT-04, NJ-07, NY-25, NY-26, NY-29, OH-2, OH-15, PA-06,

Tier 2

OH-01, PA-15

States Covered

CT, MA, MD,ME, NH, NJ, NY, OH,PA, RI, VT

This is the fourth in a series of diaries epicting the Democratic victory in this year’s midterm elections. Other diaries in this series can be seen here.

Already covered have been New England, NY, NJ, MD, and DE.

Today’s diary will focus on the Keystone state, the site of great hopes, and as today’s diary will demonstrate a great truth.  Pennsylvania really is Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with Alabama in between.  First up are the seat control charts.

2004

2006

Of  3,938,341  votes cast in 2006 US House races in Pennsylvania,   2,190,947 (55.6%) were cast for Democrats, while  1,698,641
(43.1%) were cast for Republicans.

Democrats defeated Republican incumbents in the PA-04,PA-07, PA-08, and PA-10.  

The race I enjoyed the most was the PA-10 (NE Pennsylvania), where poltical newcomer (and politcal scientist) Christopher Carney defeated incumbent Republican Don Sherwood by margin of 12,538 votes (6.1%).  The reason I am so excited by this race is because the Democratic party didn’t even run a candidate against Republicans anywhere can be taken down, we just need someone there to push.

In the PA-07 (SW Philadelphia suburbs), Democrat Joes Sestak defeated ethically challenged Republican incumbent Curt Weldon by a margin of 33,291 votes (12.7%) after revelations of suspicious dealings with Russian “businessmen”. Coming in at 56.4%, this was a 16 point improvement of the 2004 Democratic performance at 40.3%.

In the PA-08 (Bucks County, NE of Philadelphia), Democrat Patrick Murphy defeated Republican incumbent Michael Fitzgerald by a narrow margin of 1521 votes (0.6%).  Coming in at 50.3% this was a 7 point improvement over the 2004 performace at 43.3%.

In PA-04 (NW of Pittsburgh), Democrat Jason Altmire defated Republican incument Melissa Hart by a margin of 9,280 votes (3.9%).  Coming in at 51.9% this was a 16 point improvement over the 2004 performace at 35.9%.

The following map shows Democratic gains over their 2004 Democratic performance in the district (in % terms), improvements of less than 5% will be displayed in light blue, under 10% in the darker blue, and over 10% in the darkest blue.  Republican gains will be shown in the same manner, with the light red signifying a gain of less than 5% and so on. Races that were contested in eith of the years will be displayed in gray.

Looking more closely at the margin of victory in 2006 races,      Democratic defends and pickup opportunities emerge, the following map displays the margin of victory in 2006 races.  The deepest blue represents and Democratic margin of victory over 10%, the medium color represent more than 5%, while the lightest blue indicates that the Democratic candidate won by less than 5%.  Corresponding measures of Republican victory margins display progressively darker shades of red at the same intervals.

Wow.  Pennsylvania really is Philadephia and Pittsburgh with Alabama in between.  A really interesting take on this is would be to be to compare the margins from the US House races to the Senate race where Casey crushed Santorum. Nonetheless for House Democrats the situation in the interior of the state looks hopeless, though as the race in the PA-10 shows anything is possible.  I’m still puzzled by that one, I hope one of you Philly folks can explain what the hell happened there to me.

What emerges is a map to guide our 2008 strategy. In this series I have created a race tier system that is I will explain in the next few sentences.Tier 0 races are those where the Democratic candidate won by a margin of less than 5%, the presumption being that incumbency grants an advantage of 5-10% that with the fundraising advantage that comes with holding office should be sufficient for these candidates to defend their seats without funding from the party.  The assumption that incumbency gives a 5-10% advantage drives the classification of the pickup categories.  Tier 1 races are those where the incumbent won by less than 5% in 2006, while tier 2 races are those where Republicans won by less than 10%.  It’s really quite simple.

Tier 0

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

PA-04     51.9    48.1   3.9       Jason Altmire        
PA-08     50.3    49.7   0.6       Patrick Murphy

Tier 1

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

PA-06     49.4    50.6   1.3       Jim Gerlach

Tier 2

Race      D%      R%     Margin    2006 D Cand.

PA-15     44.1    52.8   8.7        Charles Dertinger

I’ve created chart below to keep a running total of races that I’ve classifed in each tier for 2008.

Tier 0

CT-02, NY-19, NH-1

Tier 1

CT-04, NJ-07, NY-25, NY-26, NY-29, PA-06,

Tier 2

No races meet the criteria for this tier.

States Covered

CT, MA, MD,ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT