Author: Inoljt

This is the second part of three posts analyzing the 2010 South Carolina  gubernatorial election, in which Republican Nikki Haley won a  closer-than-expected victory over Democrat Vincent Sheheen. The main focus of these posts will be to explore whether a racial effect  accounted for Ms. Haley’s unexpected poor performance.

The previous post can be found here, and the next post can be found here.

(Note: This is also part of a series of posts analyzing the 2010 midterm elections.)

More below.

How to Find a Racial Effect

The purpose of this series of posts is to determine whether or not Ms. Haley’s relatively weak performance was due to a racial effect.

In order to due this, it’s necessary to define what to look for. In this case, it would be normally Republican voters abandoning Ms. Haley due to her race.

Now, South Carolina is a state in which less than 5% of the population is neither white nor black; minorities other than blacks play a negligible role in the state’s politics. It is also a very racially polarized state, like most places in the  Deep South. Blacks vote Democratic; whites vote Republican.

There is one final factor to take into account. When Republican Bobby Jindal ran for governor in 2003 and faced racially-based opposition by (white) Republicans, such opposition was not evenly distributed. The Republicans who abandoned Mr. Jindal tended to be predominantly from rural, relatively lower income areas. This is something that is not especially surprising, although it conforms to some unfortunate stereotypes.

For these reasons, an examination of Republicans who abandoned  Ms. Haley for racial reasons would look specifically at areas with lower-income whites. These areas would be expected to shift more Democratic than the norm.

Democratic Shifts

To begin this post, let’s examine the places where Republicans improved upon their 2008 performance, and the places where Democrats improved upon 2008.

Naturally, given that Ms. Haley did worse than Mr. Sheheen, one would expect Democrats to have relatively more improvement.

This turns out to be the case:

Here one sees a very interesting regional pattern, a pattern that I did not expect when making this map.

The northern parts of South Carolina moved strongly Democratic in 2010. The sole exception is York County, which for whatever reason shifted Republican (there is, strangely enough, very little that differentiates this county with others in the region; nor did either Ms. Haley or Mr. Sheheen represent the county as politicians before 2010).

On the other hand, the coastal regions actually supported Ms. Haley more than they did Senator John McCain.

This is a very interesting regional divide; it is something that is entirely hidden by normal partisan patterns.

Whites

Now, let’s take a look at white registration figures:

This map shows what percent of South Carolina’s registered voters are white. The information is mandated by the Voting Rights Act, given South Carolina’s history of preventing minorities from voting, and can be found at this website. It is also quite useful for the purposes of this analysis. (For fun: compare this map to President Barack Obama’s performance).

In order to make comparisons easier, the same color scale was used in this map as in the previous map. The whiter a county’s voter population, the bluer the county on the map.

If white Republican voters rejected Ms. Haley due to her race, then the whitest counties here would also have the strongest Democratic shift (i.e. the colors in each map would roughly match).

Let’s compare the maps:

There is a bit of a match, but not much. A lot of very white counties shift strongly against Ms. Haley, but a lot of them also shift strongly for her (especially along the coast).

One can reasonably conclude that a lot of white voters – i.e. Republicans – remained loyal to Ms. Haley despite her Indian heritage.

This is not entirely unexpected. Mr. Jindal also retained a large amount of white support, mainly amongst suburban and wealthy whites.

Adjusting For Income

Where Mr. Jindal did especially poorly – and why he lost the 2003 gubernatorial election – was amongst rural, lower income whites in Louisiana.

Let’s therefore shift this analysis by adjusting for income; in other words, by focusing upon lower-income counties in South Carolina.

South Carolina’s median household income was $42,580 as of 2009, according to Census Data (which can be accessed here).

One can therefore adjust for income by restricting the analysis only to those counties in which median household income was below the state median.

This is what happens:

This looks like a far stronger relationship. In the poorer parts of South Carolina, it appears that the whiter the county, the more against Ms. Haley it shifted.

It seems that we have found something here.

So far this analysis has been relatively light on the statistical side of things; it kind of looks like there is a pattern in the map above, but perhaps there isn’t one. How likely is it that this could have occurred by chance?

The next post will answer this question.

–Inoljt

This is the first part of three posts analyzing the 2010 South Carolina gubernatorial election, in which Republican Nikki Haley won a closer-than-expected victory over Democrat Vincent Sheheen. The main focus of these posts will be to explore whether a racial effect accounted for Ms. Haley’s unexpected poor performance.

The next post can be found here.

(Note: This is also part of a series of posts analyzing the 2010 midterm elections.)

More below.

It was the October, 2010 in South Carolina. Nikki Haley, Republican candidate for South Carolina governor, was cruising. She was a conservative candidate – endorsed by none other than Sarah Palin herself – running in a conservative state, in the best Republican year in a generation.

Opinion polls showed the Republican politician leading by double-digits. Even the most pessimistic gave Ms. Haley a high single digit lead.

On election day, however, Ms. Haley won by only 4.5%:

(Note: Edited NYT Image)

What could have accounted for Ms. Haley’s poor performance?

Several factors come to mind. Ms. Haley was not an uncontroversial candidate; her positions were conservative even for South Carolina. The Democratic candidate, Vincent Sheheen, might have been an unnaturally talented campaigner. And there is always the factor of randomness to take into account. There were hundreds of races in November; the polls would inevitably be inaccurate on one or two, and this race just happened to be one of them.

Or perhaps there is another explanation – a particularly ugly one, but one that lurks at the back of everybody’s head. Ms. Haley was an woman of Indian heritage running to govern South Carolina, a state with not exactly the most innocent racial history. Throughout the campaign, Ms. Haley was subject to attacks that implicitly played up the racial angle: she had had affairs with white men (unfortunately for the accusers, this attack doesn’t work as well against women), she wasn’t Christian or was only pretending to be one, and so on.

It is not unimaginable that a sort of Bradley effect took place in South Carolina, that a number of normally steadfast Republicans balked at voting for the first non-white and female governor in history.

This is a serious accusation, and therefore needs serious evidence. The next post will therefore begin an extensive examination of whether Ms. Haley’s race undermined her performance.

–Inoljt

This is a part of a series of posts analyzing the 2010 midterm elections. This post will focus on the Illinois Senate election, in which Republican candidate Mark Kirk pulled out a close Republican victory in a strongly Democratic state.

Illinois’s Senatorial Election

More below.

Senator Mark Kirk’s victory follows the contours of a previous post, titled Previewing Senate Elections: Illinois. This post argued:

So what does Mr. Kirk have to do? Say that  he gets 35% of the vote in Cook County – propelled by inner-ring  suburban strength and minority apathy – and wins a landslide everywhere  else in the state (for instance, a 3:2 margin). This gives him 50.3% of  the vote in the 2008 Illinois electorate. If white Republicans downstate  turn out, and minorities in Chicago do not, Mr. Kirk may get bumped up  to a 2-3% victory.

As it turns out, this is almost exactly what actually happened in the election.

The previous analysis divided Illinois into three sections: Chicago, the suburbs of Chicago, and downstate Illinois. Let’s take a look at what Mr. Kirk did in each part of Illinois.

Chicago

Illinois is generally a Democratic stronghold. Cook County, home to the  city of Chicago, composes more than 40% of the state’s population, and  Democrats always win by a landslide in the county. Republicans have to  stretch themselves to the limit everywhere else in the state – winning  even the areas that normally vote Democratic – to get close.

But Republicans also must dampen Democratic margins in Cook County. This happens if Republicans can do well in the parts of Cook County outside Chicago, which are whiter and more conservative. In the city of Chicago itself, most voters are so Democratic that they will prefer not voting to casting the ballot for a Republican. There, low turn-out is more important for Republicans than actually winning over voters.

In 2010, Democratic candidate Alexi Giannoulias won 64.3% of the vote in Cook County.

At first glance, this sounds quite good. Winning 64.3% of the vote is nothing to sniff at. No president has ever won that much of the popular vote in history.

But Senator John Kerry won 70.2% of the vote in Cook County. And President Barack Obama took 76.2% of the vote. In modern Illinois politics, a Democratic candidate who takes only 64.3% of the vote in Cook County is in deep trouble.

Chicago’s Suburbs

“Previewing Senate Elections, Illinois” stated that:

The true test of Mark Kirk’s candidacy will come in the Chicago suburbs…

He will not just have to win the suburbs, but  turn the clock back two decades – back to the glory years in which  Republicans won around 70% of the vote in DuPage County. (Mr. Kirk will  probably not have to do that well, given rising Republican strength  downstate.)

Is this doable? Given that Republicans seem  to be winning suburbs everywhere this year, it is certainly possible.  Mr. Kirk, moreover, has spent a decade representing a Chicago suburb  congressional district; this is why Republicans have nominated him.

As it turned out, Mr. Kirk passed the test with flying colors. His moderate image and suburban origin led to double-digit victories in every one of the collar counties surrounding Cook County.

In the past, Republicans have won Illinois through massive support in the Chicago’s suburbs to offset the Democratic advantage in Chicago itself. Mr. Kirk was able to somewhat replicate this model in 2010:

This strength did not extend to all Republicans. Republican candidate Bill Brady, for instance, still won the Chicago suburbs. But his margins were just the slightest bit off – a high single-digit rather than double-digit victory here; a 15-point rather than 20-point margin there – and ultimately this led to Mr. Brady’s defeat.

Downstate Illinois

Imagine that the year is 1990, and Republican Mark Kirk pulls the exact same numbers in the Chicago metropolis.

Most analysts in that year would say that Mr. Kirk is on his way to a sure loss – after all, Democrats are quite competitive in downstate Illinois, and Mr. Kirk just hasn’t squeezed enough juice from the collar counties.

Today, however, downstate Illinois has trended firmly Republican. Without this trend Mr. Kirk would not have won.

Here is an illustration of Illinois in the 1992 presidential election:

President Bill Clinton is doing quite well, winning almost every single county downstate – many by double-digits. Compare this to President Barack Obama’s performance:

Mr. Obama is actually doing much better in Illinois than Mr. Clinton, and yet he loses a number of the downstate counties Mr. Clinton won.

This illustrates the shift in downstate Illinois to the Republican side, and in 2010 Mr. Kirk took full advantage of that trend to win re-election.

Conclusions

The post “Previewing Senate Elections: Illinois” concluded by mapping, somewhat light-heartedly, a hypothetical Republican victory:

Mr. Kirk’s victory ended up looking extremely similar:

All in all, it is always exciting to see a Republican victory in a Democratic  stronghold, or a Democratic victory in a Republican stronghold. Mr.  Kirk’s victory is the first time a Republican has won Illinois in quite a  while. It constitutes one of the Republican Party’s greatest triumphs  in the 2010 midterm elections.

–Inoljt

By: Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/

The state of Texas is one of the Republican Party’s most valuable strongholds. It adds a good 38 electoral votes to the Republican candidate’s electoral vote; Democrats have not been competitive in the state for at least a decade.

One of the only Democratic regions in Texas lies along the Rio Grande River:

More below.

This region is the part of Texas that borders Mexico. It is readily apparent in the map above as the only group of blue counties that President Barack Obama won outside of a major city.

The area is one of the most Hispanic areas in the United States; there are places, especially next to the border of Mexico, where the Hispanic percentage approaches 100%. Some of these people have lived along the Rio Grande for hundreds of years, with roots dating back to when Texas was a part of Mexico.

There are several other distinguishing characteristics. The parts of Texas along the Mexican border are among the poorest regions in the United States. Politically speaking, voter turn-out is very low – perhaps lower than any other part of the country.

When the rest of Texas moved steadily Republican, South Texas swung leftwards for much of the twentieth century. In 1996 the Democratic presidential nominee won almost every single county south of San Antonio, some with over 80% of the vote.

Since then, however, Republicans have recovered their verve. President George W. Bush did incredibly well amongst Hispanics in Texas; in 2004 he even won 86% Hispanic Cameron County in the Rio Grande Valley. In 2008 the Democratic presidential candidate once again posted solid numbers along the Rio Grande. Nevertheless, they ran well behind their 1996 performance throughout the region:

(Note: Edited NYT Image)

Compared to 1988 – a year in which the Democratic presidential candidate suffered a resounding national defeat – the 2008 nominee, despite winning a solid national victory, also failed to improve markedly in the Rio Grande area:

(Note: Edited Center For American Progress Image This image can be accessed here.)

Note that in 2008 Democrats lost Texas by 11.8%; in 1988 they lost Texas by 12.6%.

In the 2010 midterm elections Republicans also made several gains in South Texas, winning two heavily Hispanic congressional districts. The first was the 23rd congressional district, which is 65.5% Hispanic; the second the 27th congressional district, which is 71.6% (!) Hispanic.

These patterns are not unique to Texas. In rural south Colorado, for instance, traditionally Hispanic counties have also trended Republican since the 1990s.

Whether the areas of Texas bordering the Rio Grande River will continue moving Democratic or Republican is up-to-question. In Texas, the effects of Mr. Bush’s appeal to Hispanics still are heard; Hispanics in the state are some of the more conservative in the country. The Texas Republican Party has also been relatively moderate on immigration issues. For instance, Republican Governor Rick Perry – a firecracker on other issues – opposes SB 1070.

Needless to say, Republican success at cutting Democratic margins in the counties bordering the Rio Grande would constitute a major achievement for the party.

If a Democrat is ever to win Texas – and none has done so for more than a decade – he or she will need enormous margins there. If Republicans go from 30+% to 40+% of the vote in El Paso or Hidalgo County, it is very difficult to imagine Democrats ever winning Texas.

For more than a decade Democrats have latched onto the Great Hispanic Hope: that growing numbers of Democratic-voting Latinos in Texas will one day turn the state blue. Republican success at winning Hispanics would crush that dream.

This is a part of a series of posts analyzing the 2010 midterm elections. This post will discuss the 2010 Florida gubernatorial election, which Republican candidate Rick Scott won in an extremely close contest.

Florida’s Gubernatorial Election

On November 2010, Democrat Alex Sink faced an extremely flawed Republican opponent: multimillionaire Rick Scott, a businessman accused of heading the biggest fraud in Medicare history.

Ms. Sink still lost, running in a Republican leaning state in a very Republican environment. Here is what happened:

More below.

This constitutes a classic map of a close race in Florida. Ms. Sink wins the counties that she needs to win in the I-4 central corridor. For a Democrat, she performs relatively strongly in conservative northern Florida.

Turn-Out

What kills Ms. Sink, however, is Democratic turn-out.

To gain some perspective on this, let’s compare Ms. Sink’s performance with that of President Barack Obama’s:

Note that the circles depicted here are not equivalent. In 2008 8.4 million people voted; in 2010 only 5.3 million did. So the absolute margins of 2008 – regardless of whether Mr. Obama won or lost the county – are much bigger.

Nevertheless, one can see that Mr. Obama gets quite a bit more mileage out of the counties he wins than Ms. Sink does. This is especially true along the Democratic, minority-heavy strongholds of Orlando and South Florida.

In 2008 these places composed a greater share of the Florida electorate than they did in 2010; minority and Democratic turn-out fell disproportionately in the mid-term. In 2008 Orlando and South Florida (i.e. Broward, Miami-Dade, Orange, and Palm Beach counties) composed 31.6% of the electorate; in 2010 they composed 29.2% of the electorate. This does not seem like much, but it makes a difference when the margin of victory is 1.2%.

On a county-by-county basis, Mr. Scott’s margin would be cut from 61,550 to 15,226 in the 2008 electorate, even if his share of each county’s vote does not change (only the number of voters in each county does). I suspect that if you adjust this on a precinct level – if you give each precinct the same number of voters it had in 2008, without changing the percent of the vote Ms. Sink and Mr. Scott got in that precinct – Ms. Sink would have won outright.

Turn-Out

There is one part of Florida, however, in which Ms. Sink did much better than Mr. Obama. It’s hard see this in the previous maps, due to the low population of this region. Here is a better illustration:

As the map indicates, Northern Florida moved quite strongly towards Ms. Sink, although not strongly enough to offset her losses elsewhere.

There are a variety of explanations for why this might be. The rural, poor, Southern voters there might have been turned off a wealthy businessman as a Republican candidate. Ms. Sink might have overperformed amongst Republicans.

It is also true that Mr. Obama did quite poorly amongst these voters, losing many of these counties by 40+ margins. Partly this had to do with his status as a big-city Chicago liberal. Mostly, however, Mr. Obama did poorly because he was black.

Half a century ago northern Florida was the most Democratic part of the state, back in the days of the Solid South. Since then the Democratic Party has moved away from these voters (see: John Kerry, Barack Obama); it gets progressively harder each election for a Democrat to win them, although some still do. Ms. Sink’s improvement over Mr. Obama, then, might have been the last gasp of a dying breed: white Dixie Democrats.

Conclusions

In the dying days of Florida’s gubernatorial campaign, Democratic candidate Alex Sink was accused of cheating during the gubernatorial debate. The scandal broke during the final days of the campaign, derailing a crucial time for any campaign. Pundits will point to the scandal as responsible for the 1.2% margin by which Ms. Sink lost.

Yet it may have been another event, seemingly unrelated, that truly undid Ms. Sink. During the campaign’s final days, Independent Charlie Crist – running for Florida’s Senate seat – mounted a concerted effort to get Democrat Kendrick  Meek to drop-out. The coverage dominated national news, blackened the image of both participants, and demoralized Democrats everywhere in Florida.

It may have also led to Ms. Sink’s defeat. In many ways the candidate did what she had to do – she won the right places and improved on Mr. Obama in the most Republican part of Florida. I remember looking at her northern Florida numbers on election day and feeling somewhat optimistic about her chances. With the vote in at 50%, Ms. Sink stood behind by 5% – but the Democratic Gold Coast hadn’t started reporting. She could close things once the Democratic strongholds Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties came in.

But Ms. Sink never did fully close the gap. Democratic turn-out killed Ms. Sink, as it did with many others in 2010.

–Inoljt

P.S. Here is a table I created, some of whose information is used in this post.

Republican Margin: Change   from 2008 to 2010	2010 County Percent of Vote	2008 County Percent of Vote	Change in Turn-Out	Sink Under 2008 Electorate	County
0.11%	1.38%	1.50%	-0.12%	-26919	Alachua
-29.35%	0.15%	0.13%	0.02%	3091	Baker
-2.73%	1.03%	0.97%	0.06%	30805	Bay
-17.09%	0.15%	0.14%	0.01%	2706	Bradford
2.87%	3.66%	3.43%	0.23%	38254	Brevard
3.50%	7.83%	8.74%	-0.90%	-229201	Broward
-32.24%	0.08%	0.07%	0.01%	504	Calhoun
6.87%	1.11%	1.02%	0.09%	12047	Charlotte
-0.81%	1.02%	0.91%	0.11%	11629	Citrus
0.12%	1.19%	1.13%	0.06%	40617	Clay
10.14%	1.92%	1.69%	0.23%	46331	Collier
-12.40%	0.35%	0.34%	0.02%	6001	Columbia
-1.01%	0.13%	0.12%	0.01%	1146	Desoto
-30.47%	0.10%	0.09%	0.01%	1047	Dixie
3.81%	4.88%	4.95%	-0.07%	23793	Duval
-0.78%	1.79%	1.84%	-0.05%	28636	Escambia
11.39%	0.62%	0.59%	0.04%	4833	Flagler
-28.01%	0.08%	0.07%	0.00%	-10	Franklin
-7.45%	0.31%	0.27%	0.04%	-10451	Gadsden
-18.49%	0.10%	0.09%	0.01%	2214	Gilchrist
-0.63%	0.05%	0.05%	0.00%	832	Glades
-15.77%	0.09%	0.09%	0.01%	1693	Gulf
-13.24%	0.07%	0.07%	0.01%	75	Hamilton
-5.83%	0.10%	0.09%	0.01%	1761	Hardee
5.24%	0.12%	0.13%	-0.01%	1354	Hendry
4.90%	1.09%	1.05%	0.04%	7458	Hernando
2.20%	0.56%	0.53%	0.02%	9074	Highlands
3.79%	5.93%	6.12%	-0.19%	-17133	Hillsborough
-24.68%	0.11%	0.10%	0.01%	3460	Holmes
6.92%	0.88%	0.84%	0.04%	15364	Indian River
-24.48%	0.28%	0.26%	0.02%	754	Jackson
-14.85%	0.12%	0.09%	0.02%	-1476	Jefferson
-43.33%	0.05%	0.04%	0.01%	574	Lafayette
2.61%	1.90%	1.75%	0.15%	23697	Lake
11.33%	3.39%	3.21%	0.19%	58504	Lee
-11.04%	1.86%	1.77%	0.09%	-52485	Leon
-5.68%	0.24%	0.22%	0.01%	3976	Levy
-45.26%	0.04%	0.04%	0.00%	-43	Liberty
-10.71%	0.12%	0.11%	0.01%	-680	Madison
5.42%	1.98%	1.81%	0.17%	18952	Manatee
2.02%	2.13%	1.93%	0.20%	22073	Marion
2.07%	1.01%	0.93%	0.08%	12257	Martin
1.82%	9.11%	10.28%	-1.17%	-123556	Miami-Dade
5.01%	0.49%	0.48%	0.01%	48	Monroe
-4.23%	0.50%	0.46%	0.04%	15161	Nassau
0.69%	1.14%	1.14%	0.00%	43580	Okaloosa
-5.99%	0.15%	0.15%	0.00%	1684	Okeechobee
7.48%	5.07%	5.50%	-0.43%	-51546	Orange
13.29%	1.00%	1.20%	-0.20%	-6459	Osceola
4.16%	7.15%	7.03%	0.12%	-110658	Palm Beach
4.88%	2.55%	2.56%	-0.01%	18217	Pasco
2.55%	5.66%	5.53%	0.13%	-26374	Pinellas
4.83%	2.99%	2.92%	0.07%	26880	Polk
0.37%	0.40%	0.40%	0.00%	6523	Putnam
-3.26%	0.93%	0.91%	0.02%	34011	Santa Rosa
4.40%	2.71%	2.47%	0.24%	9360	Sarasota
4.00%	2.46%	2.45%	0.01%	13996	Seminole
-1.39%	1.40%	1.26%	0.13%	31952	St. Johns
7.18%	1.41%	1.44%	-0.03%	-5928	St. Lucie
1.21%	0.78%	0.58%	0.20%	13803	Sumter
-13.75%	0.25%	0.21%	0.04%	5189	Suwannee
-17.01%	0.12%	0.11%	0.01%	2058	Taylor
-46.53%	0.07%	0.06%	0.00%	169	Union
7.74%	2.94%	2.91%	0.03%	5093	Volusia
-21.92%	0.21%	0.17%	0.03%	415	Wakulla
-5.00%	0.35%	0.32%	0.03%	11029	Walton
-16.60%	0.15%	0.13%	0.02%	3462	Washington
3.97%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	15226	Total

Asians are one of the most ignored constituencies in American politics. When most politicians think about the Asian vote, they don’t.

Yet the Asian-American population is increasing, both in absolute terms and relative ones. By 2050, the Census estimates that Asians will compose 7.8% of the American population. Although their voting rates will still fall far short of this, the population is becoming more influential. Predicting their future voting path therefore has some utility.

In previous posts, this blogger has argued that the Latino vote will likely trend Republican, as Latinos follow the path of previous immigrants and become more assimilated.

Will the same happen for Asian-Americans?

More below.

Probably not:

As the graph above shows, the Asian vote has steadily moved Democratic, in quite a significant manner. In 1992 Republican President George H.W. Bush won 55% of the Asian vote while losing the popular vote. 12 years later, his son won only 41% of Asians, despite winning the popular vote.

The trend also does not look bright for the Republican Party. Asian-Americans who have been born in the United States are, if anything, more Democratic than those who immigrated into the country (to be fair, the latter group dominates the Asian population and will continue to do so unless immigration is drastically curtailed).

Take, for instance, the Vietnamese-American population – strong supporters of the Republican Party. The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, after conducting an extensive exit poll of Asians (perhaps the only detailed exit poll of the group in the country), found that:

Vietnamese American voters gave McCain the strongest support of all Asian ethnic groups at 67%. However, further analysis of Vietnamese American voters revealed 69% of those born in the U.S. and 60% of those 18-29 years old voted for Obama. Among Vietnamese American respondents, 15% were born in the U.S. and 25% were between the ages of 18 and 29.

The analysis goes on to conclude that:

AALDEF’s exit poll data shows that younger, U.S.-born, more recently naturalized, and English proficient Asian American citizens voted for Barack Obama for President by wide margins. Older, foreign-born citizens with limited English proficiency and who had been naturalized more than ten years ago voted in greater proportions for McCain.

There are several explanations for why this is happening. One quite plausible argument is that immigration has shifted the Asian-American population from Orange County anti-communists to Silicon Valley liberals.

Another revealing insight can be gained by comparing Asians to another very Democratic group: Jews. In many ways the two have a startling amount in common. Both groups are highly educated; both are primarily located in urban metropolitan areas; both have achieved substantial success in American society; and both have encountered quite similar types of discrimination. Even the stereotypes are similar.

Given these similarities, it is very conceivable that Asians could end up voting like Jews – one of the most liberal-minded groups in the nation.

–Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/

This is the first part of two posts analyzing patterns in the 2010 Senate midterm elections. The second part can be found here.

The 2010 congressional midterm elections constituted, by and large, a victory for the Republican Party. In the Senate Republicans gained six seats. While this was somewhat below expectations, it was much better than Republican hopes just after 2008 – when many expected the party to actually lose seats.

The Senate results provide some interesting fodder for analysis. The table below indicates which Republicans Senate candidates did the worst in 2008. It does so by taking the Republican margin of victory or defeat in a given state and subtracting this by the Cook PVI of the state (the Cook PVI is how a state would be expected to vote in a presidential election in the event of an exact tie nationwide). Given that Republicans won the nationwide vote this year, the average Republican candidate would be expected to do better than the state’s PVI. A bad Republican candidate would actually do worse than the state’s PVI.

Let’s take a look at this table below the flip.

State	Republican Margin	Cook PVI	Republican Overperformance
South Dakota	100.00%	8.9%	91.10%
North Dakota	53.91%	10.4%	43.51%
Kansas	43.72%	11.5%	32.22%
Iowa	31.05%	-1.0%	32.05%
Idaho	46.25%	17.4%	28.85%
Oklahoma	44.50%	16.9%	27.60%
Florida	28.69%	1.8%	26.89%
South Carolina	33.83%	7.8%	26.03%
New Hampshire	23.22%	-1.6%	24.82%
Arizona	24.14%	6.1%	18.04%
Alabama	30.47%	13.2%	17.27%
Ohio	17.44%	0.7%	16.74%
Georgia	19.31%	6.8%	12.51%
Arkansas	20.96%	8.8%	12.16%
Missouri	13.60%	3.1%	10.50%
Illinois	1.60%	-7.7%	9.30%
Louisiana	18.88%	9.7%	9.18%
Utah	28.79%	20.2%	8.59%
Indiana	14.58%	6.2%	8.38%
North Carolina	11.77%	4.3%	7.47%
Wisconsin	4.84%	-2.4%	7.24%
Pennsylvania	2.02%	-2.0%	4.02%
Kentucky	11.47%	10.4%	1.07%
Washington	-4.73%	-5.0%	0.27%
Alaska	11.94%	13.4%	-1.46%
Colorado	-1.63%	0.2%	-1.83%
California	-10.01%	-7.4%	-2.61%
Nevada	-5.74%	-1.3%	-4.44%
Connecticut	-11.94%	-7.1%	-4.84%
Delaware	-16.58%	-7.0%	-9.58%
Oregon	-17.98%	-4.0%	-13.98%
New York (S)	-27.84%	-10.2%	-17.64%
Maryland	-26.44%	-8.5%	-17.94%
West Virginia	-10.07%	7.9%	-17.97%
Vermont	-33.41%	-13.4%	-20.01%
New York	-34.10%	-10.2%	-23.90%
Hawaii	-53.24%	-12.5%	-40.74%
Total/Average	5.54%	2.3%	8.08%

(Note: The data in Alaska and Florida refer to the official candidates nominated by the parties, not the independent candidates – Senator Lisa Murkowski and Governor Charlie Crist – who ran in the respective states).

This table reveals some fascinating trends. There is a very clear pattern: the worst Republican candidates ran in the bluest states – and the bluer the state, the more the Republican underperformed. This does not just mean that these Republicans lost, but that they lost by more than the average Republican was supposed to in the state. Republican candidates did worse than the state’s PVI in thirteen states; nine of these states had a Democratic PVI.

There seems to be a PVI tipping point at which Republicans start underperforming: when a state is more than 5% Democratic than the nation (PVI D+5). Only one Republican in the nine states that fit this category overperformed the state PVI (Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois ).

Something is puzzling about this pattern. It is true that states like Connecticut or Maryland will probably vote Democratic even in Republican victories. The Cook PVI predicts that Democrats will win by X% in the event of a national tie in the popular vote. One would thus have expected Republican candidates to do better than this in 2010, given that 2010 was the strongest Republican performance in a generation.

Yet this did not happen. In a lot of blue states Democrats actually did better than the Cook PVI would project them to do – that is, said blue states behaved like the Democrats had actually won the popular vote, which they certainly did not in 2010. The bluer the state, the stronger this pattern.

There are a couple of reasons why this might be. The first thing that comes to mind is the money and recruiting game. The Republican Party, reasonably enough, does not expect its candidates to win in places like New York and Maryland . So it puts less effort into Republican candidates in those states. They get less money – and therefore less advertising, less ground game, and so on. Nobody had any idea who the Republican candidate in Vermont was, for instance. That probably contributes to Republican underperformance in deep-blue states.

The second factor might be a flaw in the model the table uses. Democratic and Republican strongholds, for whatever reason, behave differently from “uniform swing” models. In almost all the counties President Barack Obama won, for instance, he improved upon President Bill Clinton 1992 and 1996 performance – despite the fact that Mr. Clinton won by similar margins in the popular vote. This holds true from San Francisco to rural Mississippi . In the 2010 Massachusetts special Senate election, the most Democratic areas of Massachusetts swung least towards Republican Senator Scott Brown. The fact that the worst Republican candidates ran in the bluest states fits the pattern.

The table presents another startling pattern, which will be discussed in the next post: there are surprisingly few Republicans who did worse than they were supposed to in red states.

–Inoljt

By: Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/

On May 7th of 2010, the United Kingdom held a general election to determine its new prime minister. While the Conservative Party gained a number of seats, this was not enough to ensure a majority. Fears of a hung Parliament subsided, however, when the Conservatives joined with the Liberal Democrats to form a governing coalition.

Here is a map of the general election:

This map indicates the number of seats won by each party in the general election. Red – the traditional color for socialism – is the color of the leftist Labour Party; blue the color of the conservative Tories; yellow the color of the Liberal Democrats.

More below.

Like other countries, the United Kingdom does not vote homogeneously. Certain regions are more loyal to one party; other regions to another.

Take, for instance, three distinct parts of Great Britain: Scotland, Wales, and Southeast England. The voting patterns of all three reveal some fascinating things about the country:

As the map above indicates, Labour dominated Scotland, winning a total of 41 seats to the Conservative Party’s paltry single seat.

Several factors lie behind Scotland’s strong pro-Labour vote. There used to be a time when the Tories could rely upon a substantial bloc of Scottish voters, mostly in the rural North. Under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s term, however, pro-market reforms led to the disintegration of Scottish industry – and to this day Scotland remains hostile to the Conservative Party.

Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s Scottish heritage also helped him in the region. Indeed, in Scotland Labour did even better than the previous general election, winning 2.5% more of the vote.

A comparison of Labour’s performance in Wales provides evidence of this. Like Scotland, Wales constitutes a Labour stronghold; in 2005 Prime Minister Tony Blair led his party to win 30 seats out of 40 total (the Tories won 3). In 2010, however, the Conservative Party gained five seats in this Labour base. In Scotland support for favorite son Mr. Brown may have boosted Labour fortunes; this was not the case in Wales.

Mr. Brown’s Scottish heritage did not help him everywhere. In the South East England region the Labour Party received a pummeling from the Tories; they lost 13 seats, leaving Labour with a grand total of 4 seats. The Conservatives took 75 seats. Clearly, Mr. Brown’s appeal was limited here; it is possible that his being Scottish had something to do with this.

An examination of Southern England reveals yet more regional differences:

This map illustrates the division between Southern and Northern Great Britain. Southern England has always constituted the Tory base; Northern England the Labour stronghold.

A number of fascinating socioeconomic reasons lie behind this. Historically, Southern England was – and still is – the richest, most “snobbish” part of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the South East region constitutes the richest part of the country, apart from London. It is from this region that the Conservative Party draws its main strength.

Northern England, Scotland, and Wales are different. The forces of the Industrial Revolution have influenced their history quite profoundly; for decades their economies relied – too much, in hindsight – upon the factories, steel mills, and coal mines unleashed by industrialization. The death of Anglo-Saxon manufacturing, however, hit this region hard and left it poorer than the South.

The Industrial Revolution also catalyzed conditions ripe for socialism and left-wing politics. It created an urban proletariat – and, indeed, the Labour Party was formed to represent this class. Today these places still vote heavily for the Labour Party.

Indeed, to this day Labour constitutes the party for the working class – despite Mr. Blair’s rebranding of New Labour. This is a role the Democratic Party no longer truly holds, its grasp of the white working class torn apart by racial politics. Great Britain is still homogeneous enough to avoid this. Class still matters in the United Kingdom, far more than it does in the United States.

(Note: All images derived from BBC News.)

To follow up the series of posts on Colorado, I’ve posted a few recent presidential elections in the state (courtesy of the New York Times). Each map comes with some brief analysis.

Boosted by a Democratic National Convention held in Denver, Senator Barack Obama wins a thorough victory in the ultimate swing state of 2008. The Democratic candidate does especially well in the Republican-leaning suburbs of Denver – winning several outright and dampening margins in Douglas County and Colorado Springs.

More below.

Written off early as a sure Republican victory, Colorado surprises pundits in 2004 with a surprisingly strong Democratic performance. It is one of the few states where Democrats do better than in 2000 as they pick up the 2000 Ralph Nader vote.

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Governor George W. Bush performs well throughout the Rocky Mountains in 2000, and Colorado is no exception. With Green Party candidate Ralph Nader pulling off a substantial bloc of liberal voters, Mr. Bush even cracks the Democratic “C” that composes the Democratic base of Colorado.

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Conservative Colorado returns to form in 1996; President Bill Clinton loses the state by the barest of margins as conservative Ross Perot voters go Republican. Republican Bob Dole wins based off Republican strength in Colorado Springs and rural Colorado.

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Surprise! – reliably Republican Colorado votes Democratic for the first time in a generation, and for the first time in a competitive race since the days of Harry Truman. To be fair, this map somewhat overstates Democratic strength: Republican margins are dampened by Ross Perot’s strength amongst conservatives.

–Inoljt, http://mypolitikal.com/